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The first two chapters of this dissertation evaluate the dynamic response of human capital investment and
wage inequality to trade liberalization. The first chapter develops a structural, dynamic, general equilibrium
model of an economy in which forward-looking individuals optimally choose their levels of human capital
and sector of employment each period. The model is estimated with pseudo-panel methods using data from
Sri Lanka and then used to test the impact of a reduction in manufacturing tariffs. The results show that
the transition takes 40 years to complete and that 22% of the potential long-run welfare gains are lost due
to costly adjustment of human capital. Balanced-budget government subsidies that directly encourage skill
investment speed up the economy’s transition and can improve welfare, while employment subsidies do not.
Importantly, skill premia (wage inequality) and education investment evolve non-monotonically. These re-
sults highlight the shortcomings of reduced-form studies that correlate wage changes and trade policy changes
across different points in time: First, by ignoring labor market dynamics, these studies may erronously con-
clude a one-directional change in wage inequality. This is especially problematic if the transition is not yet
complete. Second, comparing only wage changes — rather than utility changes — fails to capture the true
welfare losses/gains experienced by different groups of individuals and the aggregate economy.
The second chapter develops a tractable version of the general equilibrium model of the first chapter to
demonstrate analytically the impact of trade liberalization. Solving the model shows that trade liberalization
can lead to rising wage inequality in developing countries even in the absence of technology spillovers.
Moreover, the greater the persistence of older generations’ human capital over time, the longer the time
frame in which wage inequality monotonically rises. This may explain why reduced-form empirical studies
find that wage inequality increased in post-liberalization developing countries, contradicting the predictions
of classical trade theory. This paper shows that while the long-run implications of classical theory still hold,
the transitions of wage inequality and human capital investment are clearly non-monotonic. When technology
spillovers occur, the type of technology determines the relative outcomes for high-skill and low-skill labor.
The third chapter documents rising wage polarization in Sri Lanka during the 1992-2009 period and finds
that these changes occurred at the level of occupations. Decomposing these wage changes shows that occupa-
tional tasks associated with technology spillovers and outsourcing have played a key role in this polarization.
In particular, returns have increased to routine mechanized tasks linked to low-wage occupations, and to infor-
mation and communication tasks linked to high-wage occupations. Both sets of tasks are highly conducive
to technology growth and outsourcing. These results highlight the importance of considering occupation-
specific skills — in addition to the traditional human capital measures of schooling and work experience —
when assessing the labor market impacts of greater international competition.
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Contrary to the predictions of classical trade theory, human capital investment and the wage-
skill premium did not decline in many post-liberalization developing countries. This paper con-
tributes to the structural trade literature by allowing for endogenous human capital investment
within a dynamic, multi-sector, overlapping-generations equilibrium framework. The model is
estimated using pseudo-panel methods with labor force data from Sri Lanka and is then used to
simulate a trade shock in the manufacturing sector. The model yields rich dynamics for wage-
skill premia, education investment, labor supply, and output following the trade shock. The
results show that the direction of change in wage-skill premia and human capital investment
varies across the economy’s transition path. This can be reconciled with the model’s overlap-
ping generations structure and the equilibrium feedback effects between human capital quantity
and skill price. Shutting off endogenous education investment results in larger welfare losses
during the adjustment period. Balanced-budget subsidies that directly encourage skill invest-
ment speed up the economy’s transition and can improve welfare, while switching subsidies do
not. Overall, the results suggest that the endogenous adjustment of skill is a key determinant
of post-liberalization outcomes in developing countries, and that policies targeting skill invest-
ment in the expanding sectors can help capture a greater share of the potential long-run gains to
trade.
∗I gratefully acknowledge the advice and guidance of Pravin Krishna and Robert Moffitt. I also thank seminar par-
ticipants at the Johns Hopkins University Economics Department and School of Advanced International Studies for their
helpful comments and suggestions. This research was conducted with restricted access data from the Department of





The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that skill premia will decrease in developing countries
following trade liberalization. However, empirical evidence has been mixed; skill premia either
increased or evolved non-monotonically in a number of developing countries that liberalized trade
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Robbins, 1996; Wood, 1997; Michaely et al., 1997; Zhu and Tre-
fler, 2001). Moreover, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that skill downgrading will occur in
developing countries following trade liberalization. Yet, evidence is also mixed with regard to the
impact of trade on schooling enrollment (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2004; Lai, 2010). A large body
of empirical and theoretical studies offer several explanations for these phenomena; e.g. differ-
ences across countries in the pre-liberalization tariff structure, the historical timing of liberalization,
skill-biased technological change, foreign direct investment (FDI), and heterogeneous firms.
However, these explanations do not account for two key aspects of an economy’s response to a
structural change. First, human capital is costly to acquire and is endogenously determined based on
market conditions. Second, the dynamics of an economy’s human capital stock — and thus output
and income — depends on the time horizon studied since different birth cohorts may experience
different adjustment costs. The model developed in this paper has finitely-lived overlapping gener-
ations. Thus, private human capital investment is costly in the form of foregone wages. Moreover,
different generations face different future wage paths. This means that the incentive for private hu-
man capital investment — which in turn determines the economy-wide skill stock and skill premia
— may depend on the post-liberalization time horizon chosen for study.
While endogenous human capital accumulation has been previously addressed in the trade lit-
erature, most of these studies model ‘skill’ as a binary variable within a two-sector framework.
However, recent work suggests that this parsimonious approach oversimplifies both the skill in-
vestment process and the labor market outcomes of trade liberalization. For example, examining
cross-country data on literacy and trade openness, Lai (2010) concludes that the skill intensity of a
country’s comparative advantage sector coupled with the level of literacy determines whether skill
investment increases or decreases in a developing countries following trade liberalization. Using a
dynamic framework, Hall (2010) determines that differences in the returns to education — in terms
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of the efficacy of technology adoption — determines whether income inequality takes a U-shaped
or inverted U-shaped transition following trade liberalization. Using a model of costly skill acquisi-
tion and a continuum of sectors/skills, Blanchard and Willmann (2013) conclude that differences in
countries’ educational cost structures can give rise to diverse post-liberalization outcomes in human
capital investment and wage inequality.
These studies suggest that models with multiple skill levels and/or multiple sectors allows for
a richer set of labor market outcomes that better conform to empirical observations. The model
developed in this paper allows individuals to optimally invest in one of several skill levels (modeled
as years of schooling) and choose employment in one of three sectors each period.
Understanding the trade-induced dynamics of human capital investment is of particular rele-
vance to policymakers. A country’s ability to absorb the potential long-run gains to trade is pos-
itively correlated with its stock of human capital (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Tybout, 2000).
Thus, reduced human capital investment in the short run following trade liberalization could dimin-
ish the potential long-run gains in real output and welfare.
This paper develops a structural, dynamic, general equilibrium framework of the labor market
to quantify the short-, medium- and long-run impact of trade liberalization on human capital invest-
ment. The model explicitly links individual education and employment decisions with the aggregate
human capital stock, output, wages, and welfare. The model is adapted from Keane and Wolpin
(1997) and Lee (2005), and includes multiple sectors, overlapping generations, heterogeneous and
forward-looking individuals, switching costs, and self selection. Individuals choose among five
mutually exclusive alternatives: employment in one of three sectors, school attendance, and home
production. Individuals’ choices determine the evolution of their human capital stock, which com-
prises education and sector-specific work experience. This, in turn, determines equilibrium labor
supply, wages, and output each period. Individuals are assumed to form rational expectations about
the future path of equilibrium wages. The model parameters govern the utility derived from each
labor-market alternative as well as switching costs.
The model parameters are identified by variation across birth cohorts in the time profiles of
labor market choices, education levels, demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, number of
children), and wages. The data set comprises successive cross sections of the Sri Lanka Labour
Force Survey (LFS). The choice of Sri Lanka is particularly suitable to the analysis as it is a small,
3
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open, developing economy which maintains high tariff rates in its tradeables sectors relative to its
developed country trading partners. The LFS covers approximately 20,000 nationally representative
households each year and spans 18 years. Thus, the data set contains a large sample size and tracks
several generations of individuals over a significant portion of their lifetimes. Since the LFS is a
repeated cross section, pseudo-panel methods — as in Browning et al. (1985) — are used in the
estimation of the model parameters.
The estimated model is then used to simulate a one-time, permanent decline in the manufactur-
ing output price. The impact of this policy change is evaluated for human capital investment, out-
put, wages, and welfare. The labor market’s transition between the initial and final ‘steady states’ is
driven by several key features of the model. First, individuals can optimally alter the composition of
their human capital stock by attending school or choosing where to work. Second, the overlapping
generations feature means that older individuals retire each year to be replaced by younger individ-
uals. Third, individuals can choose home production as a labor market alternative, allowing them to
temporarily exit the labor market in the event of an unfavorable wage draw. Fourth, switching into
one sector from another alternative incurs a cost.
At the aggregate level, the economy’s transition is driven primarily by sector-specific returns
to human capital — i.e. ‘skill’ prices. Because skill prices adjust in equilibrium, a one-time trade
liberalization in one sector will affect current and future skill prices in all three sectors. This in turn
affects the relative returns to education across sectors, and thus, the incentives for private human
capital investment during the transition period.
The results from the trade policy simulation reveals that both education investment and the skill
premium evolve non-monotonically during the transition, which takes several years. The initial
downward pressure on the skill premium is gradually reversed as workers move out of manufac-
turing. Over time, new generations enter the labor market, sorting into the low-skill agriculture
sector and a larger proportion into the high-skill non-tradeables sector; thus, new generations sort
into greater skill extremes. Both physical capital and high-skill labor move into the two remaining
sectors, but the high-skill non-tradebles sector absorbs a larger proportion of this reallocation. This
raises skill investment once again, but eventually narrows the skill premium. However, as a result
of this sorting into skill extremes, the new stead-state skill premium exceeds the old. The time-
consuming transition results in a 22% loss of the long-run potential welfare gains from trade; i.e. if
4
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the transition were instantaenous, this loss would not occur. Shutting off the possibility of endoge-
nous education investment consumes an additional 8% of potential long-run gains and results in a
less volatile transition of the skill premium over time.
While individuals employed in manufacturing at the time of the tariff reduction experience large
welfare losses, the average individual enjoys a welfare gain. A balanced-budget subsidy that targets
enrollment in school or vocational training in the non-tradeables sector speeds up the transition,
increases aggregate welfare, and reduces welfare losses of manufacturing workers. In contrast, a
switching subsidy that assists manufacturing workers improves welfare for those particular work-
ers and speeds up the transition, but decreases aggregate welfare. This suggests that governments
should implement policies that directly target skill investment if the goal is to mitigate as much as
possible the adjustment costs of trade liberalization.
Overall, these results suggest that the endogenous adjustment of skill is an important determi-
nant of post-liberalization outcomes in developing countries, and that policies targeting skill invest-
ment in the expanding sector can harness a greater share of potential long-run gains.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the diverse and growing body of literature on the labor market impact of
trade policy. One branch of this research examines correlations between industry-specific wages and
industry-specific measures of trade such as import prices (Revenga, 1992), tariffs (Pavcnik et al.,
2004a), and import shares (Kletzer, 2002; Pavcnik et al., 2004b). Another branch of research focuses
on the labor demand side, examining the impact of trade on industry-specific employment (Trefler,
2004), on income inequality and unemployment under search-and-matching frictions (Helpman and
Itskhoki, 2009), on wages paid by importing versus exporting firms (Amiti and Davis, 2012), and on
job turnover (Davidson and Matusz, 2005). The impact of trade on labor supply supply decisions
is examined in (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2004). The within-country local labor markets effects of
national trade policies are studied in McLaren and Hakobyan (2010) and Kovak (2013).
Several recent studies have examined the dynamics of the labor market’s repones to trade reform,
both from a labor demand perspective (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2011) and a labor supply
perspective (Artuc, 2009; Artuc et al., 2010; Cosar, 2013; Dix-Carneiro, 2013). This paper fits in
with the latter body of literature. The dynamic approach permits individual welfare to be measured
5
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in terms of lifetime utility instead of static wage changes. Moreover, the dynamic approach permits
a richer analysis since it tracks the economy’s adjustment over several years as well as provides a
setting for counterfactual experiments.
Artuc et al. (2010) study the inter-sectoral movement of labor in a structural dynamic framework
with switching costs and homogenous workers with infinite lives. They find that, although the
mean and variance of switching costs is high and results in slow adjustment, trade liberalization
leads to welfare gains. This paper differs from their approach in a number of important ways.
Firstly, workers are heterogeneous in multiple dimensions, allowing for an analysis of how trade
reform affects multiple types of individuals and providing a framework for targeting labor market
policies at specific groups. Secondly, individuals endogenously accumulate human capital, where
the ‘endogenous’ aspect facilitates adjustment while the ‘accumulate’ aspect can act as a barrier to
adjustment. Thirdly, individuals can choose to temporarily exit the labor market, which conforms to
findings in previous studies that wage shocks affect labor supply decisions (Edmonds and Pavcnik,
2004).
Cosar (2013) develops an overlapping generations model with ex-ante homogeneous workers,
sector-specific human capital accumulation, search-and-matching frictions, and wage bargaining.
He finds that sector-specific human capital interacted with search-and-matching frictions generates
an externality than explains a very slow labor-market adjustment to trade shocks. Two key features
distinguish this paper from his. Firstly, the labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, so
labor market frictions do not come into play. Instead, barriers to mobility come from the interac-
tion between sector-specific human capital and finite horizon life-cycle effects, as well as switching
costs. Secondly, sector-specific work experience is allowed to transfer across sectors, albeit imper-
fectly.1 This results in higher mobility and faster adjustment than Cosar’s paper, while capturing
the more realistic scenario that individuals are rewarded for general skills (acquired from total work
experience) in addition to sector-specific skills.
Artuc (2009) and Dix-Carneiro (2013) adapt the same discrete-choice framework of Keane and
Wolpin (1997) used in this paper. Both papers feature multiple sectors, overlapping generations,
heterogeneous workers, and switching costs. They find that the welfare impact of trade reform
differs significantly between younger versus older workers. In addition, Artuc (2009) finds that
1Cosar (2013) assumes all accumulated work eperience is lost when a worker switches out of his current sector.
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the welfare impact depends on the individual’s sector of employment at the time of reform. Both
studies also find that switching costs are large and are the primary reason for slow adjustment.
This paper differs from theirs in two important ways. Firstly, it allows for investment in education,
which also means that the decision process starts at a younger age (15 as opposed to 25). This
allows for early-life human capital investments to persist throughout the lifetime, as has been found
in the labor literature (Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Cunha et al., 2010). Persistence of early choices
has implications for inter-sectoral mobility and adjustment costs. More importantly, one of the main
motivations of this study is to evaluate the impact of trade liberalization on human capital formation,
of which schooling is a key component. Inclusion of a schooling choice also allows for policy
experiments explicitly targeting schooling incentives, such as an education subsidy. Thus far, the
literature has focused almost exclusively on testing unemployment insurance and re-employment
subsidies. Secondly, this paper imposes rational expectations on individuals. The counterfactual
experiments show that, compared to adaptive expectations, rational expectations leads to smaller
inter-sectoral labor reallocation in the short run as individuals correctly anticipate that short-term
changes in skill prices are partially undone in the long-run as the economy settles to a new steady
state. Moreover, individual welfare losses are smaller under rational expectations, a result which
has implications for the structure and magnitude of different labor market policies that assist the
economy’s transition.
2 Model
The model is adapted from the dynamic, discrete choice framework of Keane and Wolpin (1997) and
Lee (2005). In any given time period, the economy is populated with individuals aged 15 through
65. At each age, individuals maximize expected lifetime utility by choosing among five mutually
exclusive and exhaustive labor market alternatives: 1. Employment in the agricultural sector, 2.
Employment in the manufacturing sector, 3. Employment in the services sector, 4. Attend school,




The individual’s flow utility from working in sector j = 1, 2, 3 in year t is the wage earned, wj . The
wage equals the sector-specific equilibrium price of human capital (skill price), rjt, multiplied by
the individual’s human capital in that sector, hjt:
Ujt(a) = wjt = rjt · hjt (1)
The agent’s stock of human capital in sector j = 1, 2, 3 is defined as:
hjt = exp(βj1 · (a− 14) + βj2 · (a− 14)
2 + βj3 · Educ+ βj4 ·Male
+ βj5 · Exp1 + βj6 · Exp2 + βj7 · Exp3 + ǫjt) (2)
where Educ is years of schooling, Expj is total years of work experience in secror j = 1, 2, 3,
Male is a dummy variable for gender, and ǫjt is an idiosyncratic shock to human capital in sector j
at time t. The specification allows for work experience accumulated in one sector to be transferred
to all other sectors, with the degree of transferability governed by the coefficients βj5, βj6 and βj7.
The intercepts of the human capital production function have been normalized to zero since they
cannot be separately identified from the sector-specific skill price, rjt. If the individual chooses to
work in sector j = 1, 2, 3 at age a, he will enter age a+1 with an additional year of work experience
in that sector: Expj(a+ 1) = Expj(a) + 1.
The flow utility from attending school is:
U4t(a) = exp(β40 + β41 · (a− 14) + β42 · (a− 14)
2 + β43 · Educ
+ β44 ·Male+ β45 · I{s ≥ O
′Level}+ β46 · I{s ≥ A
′Level}+ ǫ4t) (3)
where O′Level and A′Level stand for the Ordinary Level (O’Level) and Advanced Level (A’Level)
educational qualifications, respectively, and I is an indicator variable for whether that particular
schooling milestone has been reached. 2 The coefficient β43 allows for the possibility that agents
2The O’Level and A’Level are two examinations administered nationwide each year by the Sri Lankan government in
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with more years of schooling derive greater utility from attending school. The coefficient β45 cap-
tures any pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs to attending school beyond the O’Level qualification,
while β46 captures any additional costs to attending school beyond the A’Level.
3
The schooling utility specification attempts to capture the life-cycle pattern of school attendance
and educational attainment observed in the data; attendance declines rapidly with age, the number
of years of schooling is clustered around 11 and 13 (when the O’Level and A’Level, respectively,
are completed), and the percentage of people who have passed the O’Level far exceeds that for
the A’Level. The term ǫ4t is an idiosyncratic shock to schooling utility at time t. If the individual
chooses to attend school at age a, he will enter age a + 1 with an additional year of schooling:
Educ(a+ 1) = Educ(a) + 1.
The flow utility from home production is:
U5t(a) = exp(β50 + β51 · (a− 14) + β52 · (a− 14)
2 + β53 · Educ
+β54 ·Male+ β55 ·Kids+ ǫ5t) (4)
where Kids is the number of children below age six who reside in the household.4 The coefficient
β55 captures any impact of young children on home production utility. For simplicity, the variable
Kids is assumed to take on the values {0, 1, 2}. In addition, Kids is assumed to follow an exoge-
nous Markov process that is known to all agents, and depends on age, year, gender, and education
level. If the individual chooses home production at age a, his sector-specific work experience and
accordance with the country’s British-patterned education system. Typically, the O’Level exams are taken at age 16 after
two years of coursework, and passing grades in key subjects are a requirement to qualify for A’Level coursework. The
A’Level (or collegiate) examinations are taken at age 18 or 19 after three years of coursework and high passing grades
are required for entrance to the country’s public universities.
3In the labor literature, the key educational milestones are usually high school graduation and college graduation.
However, due to the small number of places available each year in Sri Lanka’s higher education institutions, only 1.42 of
the total population has obtained any form of college/university education. In comparison, 15.79 and 7.73, respectively,
have an O’Level and A’Level qualification. Moreover, O’Level coursework in Sri Lanka is considered to be on par with
high school coursework in the United States, and A’Level coursework on par with the first two years of college. This is
supported by the fact that students who have passed the O’Level exams are eligible to apply to US colleges, while those
who have passed the A’Level exams are given two college courses worth of academic credit for each subject passed with
at least a grade of C. Thus, in this model, an agent who has obtained at least an O’Level qualification should be viewed
as having earned the equivalent of a US high school degree or more, while an agent with at least an A’Level qualification
has obtained the equivalent of two years of US college coursework or more.
4Note that the agent need not be the children’s parent. Given the extended family structure of a typical Sri Lankan
household, the presence of very young children could affect the labor market choices of parents and non-parents (e.g.
older siblings, aunts, grandparents) alike.
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years of schooling remains unchanged when he enters age a+ 1.
The 5x1 vector of idiosyncratic flow utility shocks, ǫt = [ǫ1t, ǫ2t, ǫ3t, ǫ4t, ǫ5t], is drawn from a
normal distribution that is independent across individuals, alternatives and time:
ǫt ∼ N (0,Σ)
where Σ is a diagonal variance-covariance matrix.
2.2 Switching Costs
An individual who enters sector j′ = 1, 2, 3 at time t from sector j = 1, ..., 5 at time t− 1 incurs a









exp(γj0 + γj1 · a+ γj2 · a
2 + γj3 ·Male) j
′ 6= j, j′ = 1, 2, 3
0 j′ = j, j′ = 1, ..., 5
(5)
Note that switching into school or home production does not incur a cost. The switching cost
can be interpreted as capturing all unobserved pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs associated with
finding a job in a new sector. Pecuniary costs can include expenses associated with job search and
geographic relocation. Non-pecuniary costs can include the psychological costs to switching, such
as reluctance to change the status quo.
2.3 Aggregate Production






where pjt is the market price of sector j output, Ajt is the Hicks-neutral technology parameter, Hjt
is the aggregate quantity of human capital, Kjt is the physical capital stock, and αjt is the labor
share of output. All of these variables are time dependent.
The aggregate quantity of human capital, Hjt, is the sum of sector-specific human capital over







where hijt is the sector-specific human capital of agent i, and di is an indicator for whether the agent
chose to work in sector j (di = 1) or not (di = 0).
The labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Thus, the skill price, rjt, equals the



















where the ∗ subscript for rjt indicates that this is an equilibrium quantity.
2.4 Expectations
An individual’s choice at age a and time t depends on his expectations about future utility. Recall





Thus, to compute expected future wages, the individual must form expectations about future
equilibrium skill prices. Agents are assumed to form rational expectations about the current and fu-
ture path of equilibrium skill prices. A rational expectations equilibrium skill price series, {r∗jt}
T
t=1,
where T is the terminal period, satisfies the following conditions:
1. Agents have perfect foresight about future skill prices, {r∗t }
T
t=1, and make current decisions
based on that knowledge.
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2. The labor market clears in each time period.
2.5 State Transitions
At any age a, the individual’s state vector is the set of variables whose quantities are known and
which determine the present value of expected lifetime utility. Given the flow utility functions and
the rational expectations assumption for skill prices, the individual’s state vector at age a is:
Ωa = {Exp1, Exp2, Exp3, Educ,Kids(a), Choice, ǭa, r̄(a)
∗}
where ǭa is the 5x1 vector of idiosyncratic shocks to flow utility at age a, and ¯r(a)∗ is the vector
of current and future equilibrium skill prices from age a through 65 for all sectors j = 1, 2, 3. The
agent’s state vector evolves from age a to a + 1 depending on the choice he makes at age a. For
each of the five possible choices, the state vector evolves as follows (the individual state variable
that changes with each choice is shown in red):
Ωa+1 = {Exp1 + 1, Exp2, Exp3, Educ,Kids(a+ 1), ǭa+1, r̄(a+ 1)
∗}
Ωa+1 = {Exp1, Exp2 + 1, Exp3, Educ,Kids(a+ 1), ǭa+1, r̄(a+ 1)
∗}
Ωa+1 = {Exp1, Exp2, Exp3 + 1, Educ,Kids(a+ 1), ǭa+1, r̄(a+ 1)
∗}
Ωa+1 = {Exp1, Exp2, Exp3, Educ+ 1,Kids(a+ 1), ǭa+1, r̄(a+ 1)
∗}
Ωa+1 = {Exp1, Exp2, Exp3, Educ,Kids(a+ 1), ǭa+1, r̄(a+ 1)
∗}
It is assumed that individuals have zero years of work experience at age 15: Expj = 0 for
a = 15 and j = 1, 2, 3. Note that work experience and years of schooling remain unchanged if the
agent chooses home production.
2.6 Individual Maximization Problem
At any age a, the individual’s problem is to choose the alternative j = 1, ..., 5 that maximizes

























where dj(a) = 1 when alternative j is chosen at age a and dj(a) = 0 otherwise. The term δ is the
time discount factor.
The solution to the individual’s decision problem is obtained recursively. Define V (Ω(a)) as
the value function at age a given the state vector Ω(a). Define V j(Ω(a)) as the expected present
value from choosing alternative j = 1, ..., 5. Then, the value function at age a is:















U j(a) + δEV j(Ω(a+ 1)) ifa < 65
U j(a) ifa = 65
(13)
The term E indicates that V j(Ω(a+ 1)) is an expected value. Given the assumption of rational
expectations for equilibrium skill prices, the only source of uncertainty for agents is the realization
of their idiosyncratic utility shocks. (All agents are assumed to know the distribution from which
the utility shocks are drawn.)
The multi-dimensional nature of the choice problem leads to a very large number of feasible
state vectors; for example, there are 5.6 milllion possible states that a 65-year-old individual can
achieve, 4.5 million possible states that a 64-year-old can achieve, and so on. Appendix A describes
the methods used to circumvent this problem in solving the choice model.
2.7 Equilibrium Skill Prices
The model assumes no aggregate shocks. Therefore, the only source of uncertainty in the model is
the realization of future idiosyncratic utility shocks. However, because a large number of individuals
populate the economy at any given time, these idiosyncratic shocks are averaged out. Thus, the
13
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time path of equilibrium skill prices is deterministic, and is assumed to be deterministic from an
individual perspective as well. This means that the future skill prices upon which individuals base
their current decisions are also the skill prices that are eventually realized; that is, individuals have
rational expectations. Because different birth cohorts are alive during different time spans, each
cohort faces a different path of equilibrium skill prices from age 15 through age 65.
To compute the rational expectations equilibrium skill price path, the method developed in Lee
(2005) is adapted to make the estimation routine run much faster. First, one complete estimation
routine is conducted under adaptive expectations only. That is, for a given parameter set Θ, indi-
viduals at time t solve the choice problem by assuming that the current period’s equilibrium skill
prices will persist forever: r∗jt = rj,t+1 = ... = rjT for each j = 1, 2, 3. When the economy moves
forward to time t + 1 and the equilibrium skill price is updated to r∗j,t+1 (which is not necessarily
equal to r∗jt ), individuals assume that r
∗
j,t+1 persists forever. Thus, the skill price path obtained
in this manner is an equilirbium path, though not a rational expectations path; this is because the
assumption of adaptive expectations is violated each period.
Once the optimal parameter set, Θ̂A, is obtained under adaptive expectations, a second estima-
tion routine is conducted under rational expectations with Θ̂A as the initial parameter set. Individ-
uals are now assumed to perfectly forecast the year-on-year ratio of future skill prices. This time









t=1 is the equilibrium skill price sequence obtained under the optimal parameter set,
Θ̂A, with adaptive expectations. This equation yields a sequence of skill prices that can be written in
terms of rj1. Once rj1 is determined in equilibrium in period 1, the economy moves forward to pe-
riod 2 and a new sequence of skill prices written in terms of rj2 is obtained. This process is repeated
thought time T , yielding a second sequence of equilibrium skill prices, {r∗R1jt }
T
t=1 (where R1 signi-
fies iteration 1 of the rational expectations computation routine.) This process is repeated to obtain










t=1 until the sequences converge
under a pre-determined criterion. The parameter set is then updated to ΘR1 via an optimization
algorithm and the rational expectations iterations are repeated as above. The ‘true’ deterministic
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path of skill prices, {r∗Rjt }
T
t=1, is the one obtained from the optimal parameter set determined under
rational expectations, Θ̂R.
Note that the rational expectations computation routine requires generating several skill price
sequences for a single parameter set. This means that the model must be solved and the econ-
omy’s time path simulated multiple times for every tested parameter set in the estimation, a time-
consuming process. 5 This paper improves on the method of Lee (2005) by testing several parameter
sets first under adaptive expectations only, which takes about 10% of the time required for a rational
expectations run. The resulting optimal parameter set, Θ̂A, then acts as a very ‘good’ initial guess
for the rational expectations run. As it turned out, Θ̂A is very close to Θ̂R, which means that the
number of parameter searches required under rational expectations is very small. This considerably
reduces the estimation time compared to the original method of Lee (2005).
3 Data
3.1 Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey
The model is estimated using data from the Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey (LFS), a repeated cross
section of approximately 20,000 households surveyed each year since 1992. Each quarter, the De-
partment of Census and Statistics (DCS) samples approximately 5,000 nationally representative
households to be interviewed during a home visit. Respondents are asked to report their age, gen-
der, number of years of schooling completed, whether the O’Level or A’Level qualifications have
been obtained, and whether the individual currently works, attends school or stays at home. For
individuals who are employed, the four-digit ISIC industry classification is recorded.6 Because the
data is recorded by household, the number of children — and their ages — in each household is
visible. The data spans 18 survey years, from 1992 through 2009. For the estimation, observations
are restricted to individuals aged 15 through 65 who have reported that they are either employed,
attending school, or staying at home, and whose household structure (i.e. number of children) is
visible. This leaves approximately 890,000 individual observations across 18 years.
5In Lee (2005), for a given parameter set, Θ, the choice problem is first solved under adaptive expectations. The
resulting skill price ratios are then used to start off the first iteration of the rational expectations computation routine,
under the same parameter set, Θ. Thus, the model’s solution and simulation must be conducted many times for each and
every parameter set tested in the estimation routine.
6ISIC - International System of Industry Classification
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The model assumes that employment, schooling and home production choices are mutually
exclusive. However, the data shows that some individuals engage in several of these activities
during the year. Thus, each individual is assigned to just one of the five alternatives based on the
information he reported. An individual is considered to been employed if he reported that he worked
for either a wage, profit (self-employment) or family gain during the previous week, or he had a job
but did not work the previous week due to other reasons.7 The sector of employment — agriculture,
manufacturing, services — is determined from the 4-digit ISIC code assigned to each employed
person. For individuals who worked at multiple jobs, the job reported as the main economic activity
is selected. An individual is considered to have attended school if he reported that he attended
school and was not employed the previous week. An individual is considered to have engaged in
home production if he neither attended school nor was employed.
Since the model assumes that all employment is full time, the wage parameters are estimated
using hourly wages rather than annual wages. This prevents having to distinguish between full-
time and part-time workers. For employed individuals, the LFS reports the monthly wage and the
number of hours usually worked per week. Number of hours worked per month is computed by
scaling weekly hours upwards by 30.41677 = 4.3452, where 30.4167 is the average number of days
in a month and 7 is the number of days in a week. The hourly wage is then obtained by dividing the
monthly wage by the number of hours worked per month.
Employed individuals report the number of years and months in their current job. Those who
have been employed in the current job for less than 12 months are assumed to have switched into
that sector from either another sector, school or home in the previous period. Those who have been
employed in the current job for at least 12 months are assumed to have worked in that sector during
the previous year, and therefore, did not switch.
The model is estimated via simulated method of moments (SMM), which matches sample mo-
ments from the LFS data to moments generated from simulating the model. The model parameters
are estimated to minimize the weighted distance between the sample moments and simulated mo-
ments. Four main types of moments are used:
7According to the LFS, an individual with a job may not have worked the previous week due to vacation, off-season
activity, a labor dispute, bad weather, mechanical failure or fuel shortage.
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1. Choice Probabilities: The proportion of people who are employed in agriculture, employed
in manufacturing, employed in services, attending school, and staying at home
2. Wages: The mean and standard deviation of hourly wages in agriculture, manufacturing and
services
3. Schooling: The proportion of people with completed schooling categorized into four main
education levels
4. Switching Probabilities: The proportion of new entrants (i.e. with less than 12 consecutive
months in the current job) into agriculture, manufacturing and srvices
All moments are conditioned on age, year and gender. The choice, wage and schooling mo-
ments are also conditioned on education level, while the choice moments are further conditioned on
whether at least one child aged 6 or below is part of the household. Education is categorized into
four levels: less than secondary school (0-8 years), lower secondary school (9-10 years), O’Level
completion but not A’Level completion (11-12 years), and A’Level completion and above (13 or
more years). These cutoffs are determined to match the data, which shows that individuals are clus-
tered around these four education levels. The total number of conditional moments to be matched
is 93,600.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows the choice proportions for each gender from 1992 through 2009. The probability of
attending school declines rapidly with age. Females are much more likely than males to remain at
home, and the probability increases rapidly after about age 50. The percentage of males working in
agriculture and services is much higher than that of females. However, the probabilities of working
in manufacturing are almost identical for the two genders. This is likely because Sri Lanka’s large
textile and garment industry chiefly employs women.
The cohort-specific wage profiles are shown in Figure 2. These are constructed by plotting each
birth cohort’s mean wage at every age for the age range observed in the data for that particular
cohort. For example, the 1977 birth cohort’s mean wage profile is observed from age 15 (in 1992)
through age 32 (in 2009). The 1976 cohort’s profile is observed from age 16 (in 1992) through age
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33 (in 2009), and so on. As with an individual wage profile, the cohort wage profiles are concave
with respect to age.
Figure 3 shows the mean log hourly real wage (in local currency) across time for each sec-
tor and gender. Wages are generally higher for males in all sectors, with the largest premium in
manufacturing.
Figure 4 plots, for each gender and age, the average number of children aged 6 and below
residing in the household. Average number of children peaks at age 30 for females and age 34 for
males, and then increases again after age 50. The latter phenomenon is likely due to the extended
family structure common in Sri Lanka where live-in grandparents often help raise young children.
3.3 Population Data
To generate the simulated moments required in the SMM estimation procedure, the economy must
be simulated forward year by year all the way through 2009. Therefore, a starting distribution of
individuals is needed. The starting distribution must include each individual’s sector-specific work
experience, completed schooling, previous year’s choice, age, gender, and number of children; these
are the individual state variables that determine choices. However, the LFS being a repeated cross
section, individuals’ lifetime sector-specific work experience is not recorded. Therefore, following
the method of Lee (2005) and Lee and Wolpin (2006), the missing variable is generated by starting
the economy several years prior to the first data year; in this case, 1920. Without any information
on Sri Lanka’s 1920 population, the 1920 starting distribution is created arbitrarily. All individuals
are assumed to have exactly five years of schooling. Work experience in agriculture, manufacturing
and services is randomly chosen based on the individual’s age. The distribution of gender in 1920
is assumed to be evenly split between males and females, as it is for the 1992-2009 period. Start-
ing from 1991 and working backwards, the number of children age 6 and under is assumed to be
progressively higher to account for higher birth rates in the past. Note that while the economy is
simulated from 1920 through 2009, only the simulated moments from 1992 onwards are matched
with the sample moments.
The economy evolves forward each year with the retirement of the oldest cohort (those aged 65)
and the entry of the youngest cohort (those aged 15). Thus, a distribution of incoming 15-year-olds
is needed for every year from 1921 through 2009. The incoming distributions for 1992 through
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2009 are obtained directly from the LFS data. The distributions for 1921 through 1991 are based
upon the 1992 incoming distribution. Starting from 1991 and working backwards, each distribution
is assumed to be progressively less educated and have more young children living in the household.
The rate at which this progression takes place is chosen arbitrarily.
Recall that r∗jt, the equilibrium skill price in sector j at time t, is the skill price at which sector-
specific aggregate labor demand equals aggregate labor supply. Labor demand is computed directly
from national accounts data, while labor supply is computed from simulating the model. In the
SMM estimation procedure, N = 800 individuals from each cohort are simulated. Aggregate labor








The term Ci is individual i’s cohort size. Thus, cohort sizes are required for all ages 15 through
65 and all years 1920 through 2009. For the 1992-2009 period, cohort sizes are obtained from the
LFS by summing population weights across all individuals surveyed in that cohort. For the 1940-
1991 period, cohort sizes are obtained from the United Nations Demographic Yearbooks (UNDY).
For the 1920-1944 period, only data on total population is available. Cohort sizes for this time
period are computed by extrapolation, using cohort size information from later years.
3.4 Markov Process for Number of Children
The exogenous Markov process for the variable Kids (the number of children age 6 and under) is
computed directly from LFS data by backcasting household members’ ages. Consider, for example,
the transition probability from 0 to 1 child for an individual aged 25 in year 1992. The backcasting
procedure is as follows: First, use the 1992 LFS cross section to count the number of 25-year-old
individuals in 1992 with 1 child; call this value N11992. Second, reduce the ages of all individuals
in 1992 by one year; this gives the same 1992 households as they would have been in 1991. From
this, count the number of 24-year-olds with 0 children; call this value N01992−1. The 0 to 1 transition








In addition to age, these year-by-year transition probabilities are also conditioned on year, gen-
der, and education level. Since Kids takes on values of only 0, 1 or 2 in the model, individuals in
the data with 3 or more children are assumed to have only 2. Due to a lack of detailed household
data, the transition probabilities for 1920-1991 are assumed to be identical to that of 1992.
3.5 Aggregate Data
Agents make their decisions based, in part, on current and future equilibrium sector-specific skill
prices. Recall that the equilibrium skill price in sector j = 1, 2, 3 is determined by equating labor














The left-hand side of this equation is the sum of wages earned by all individuals who opti-
mally chose to work in sector j at time t; it is the equilibrium skill price multiplied by aggregate
sector-specific human capital. This quantity must equal total labor compensation, αjtYjt, the right-
hand side of the equation. Total labor compensation is computed directly from national accounts
data. Thus, the equilibrium skill price is determined by imposing equality between aggregate wages
(computed by simulating the model) and total labor compensation (national accounts data).
To compute total labor compensation, the quantities Yjt and αjt for each j and t must be ob-
tained. In this model, Yjt is sector-specific gross value added, which is computed as sector-specific
gross domestic product minus subsidies plus taxes. The World Development Indicators (WDI) re-
ports data on sector-specific gross value added for Sri Lanka going back to 1959. Since the economy
starts in 1920 for the estimation, the value added time series is extrapolated back to 1920 via log
regression.
The term αjt is the labor share of sector-specific value added. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka
(CBSL) reports data on compensation of employees, CEjt, for each sector going back to 1983. For







For 1920-1982, the labor shares are assumed to be the same as in 1983.
The compensation data series, CEjt, does not include the informal sector, which is expected to
be large in a developing country. Moreover, the relative size of the informal sector is most likely
to be largest in agriculture, and smallest in manufacturing. Thus, the values of αjt are adjusted
accordingly.8
4 Identification
4.1 Sector-Specific Work Experience
Recall that human capital is a function of total years of work experience, Expj , in each sector
j = 1, 2, 3. With an adequately long panel data set, an individual’s complete choice history starting
from age 15 is observed, making it possible to track total years of work experience accumulated
since age 15. The coefficients for work experience would then be identified by summing up the
number of times each individual chose sector j = 1, 2, 3 during his lifetime. However, the LFS data
is a repeated cross section (RCS), giving no information about individual choice histories. Thus, it
is not possible to compute total years of work experience, Expj .
9 Another identification strategy
must therefore be implemented.
Even though individual choice histories are unavailable, the choice histories of distinct birth
cohorts are observed. 10 Specifically, the proportion of individuals aged a in survey year t who
chose each alternative j can be computed from the data. The same birth cohort is then followed into
the next survey year, t + 1, where the proportion of individuals aged a + 1 who chose alternative
j is observed. In this manner, the choice probability profiles of a single birth cohort can be tracked
over time.
8Gollin (2002) finds that Sri Lanka’s economy-wide labor share must be inflated from 0.493 to 0.575 to account for
the informal sector. Accordingly, this paper computes sector-specific employee compensation to match an economy-wide
labor share of 0.6, under the assumption that the informal sector is twice as large in agriculture and 1.5 times as large in
services compared to manufacturing.
9While the choice history of school attendance is also not observed, the LFS records every individual’s completed
years of schooling to date. Thus, the state variable Educ is directly available in the data for each individual.
10A birth cohort is identified by age and time period. For example, individuals aged 15 in year 1992 belong to the birth
cohort born in 1977. Individuals aged 16 in year 1993 belong to the same 1977 birth cohort.
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The idea behind identification of dynamic models with RCS data is that if there exists a ‘best’ set
of parameters that governs the observed individual outcomes, then it is also the best set of parame-
ters that governs the outcomes of appropriately aggregated groups of individuals. This identification
strategy theory goes back to Browning et al. (1985) 11 and Deaton (1985), and was motivated by
the dearth of panel data along with the availability of high-quality RCS data in many countries.12
The theory was expanded upon by Moffitt (1993) who demonstrated that, under certain restrictions,
models that are both linear and non-linear in parameters are identified and can be consistently esti-
mated with group aggregated RCS data as long as a full set of cohort and age dummies are used.
In this model, an individual accumulates work experience over time by the choices he makes
each period. To see how cohort choice profiles identify the work experience parameters, consider a
hypothetical birth cohort, c, who are aged 15 in year t. Recall that agents are assumed to enter the
decision-making period with zero work experience; i.e. Expcjt(15) = 0 for all j = 1, 2, 3. Suppose
that 25%, 20% and 15% of individuals in cohort c chose to work in sector 1, 2 and 3, respectively,
at age 15 and time t. Then, cohort c enters age 16 at time t + 1 with Expc1,t+1(16) = 0.25,
Expc2,t+1(16) = 0.2 and Exp
c
3,t+1(16) = 0.15. This cumulation proceeds through age 65. Thus, as
with the choice histories of different individuals in a panel data set, the choice probability profiles
of different birth cohorts in a RCS data set identify the work experience parameters.
4.2 Switching Costs
The switching cost parameters are identified by the proportion of currently employed individuals
who worked in the same sector in the previous year. Due to the RCS nature of the data, prior choices
are not directly observed. Instead, they are proxied from current job tenure, which is recorded in the
LFS in years and months. An individual who has worked more than 12 months in his current job in
sector j = 1, 2, 3 is assumed to have worked in sector j during the previous year, and therefore did
not switch sectors. An individual with 12 months or less in his current job in sector j is assumed to
have switched from another alternative j′ 6= j in the previous year.
However, many individuals likely change jobs while remaining in the same sector. Lee and
Wolpin (2006) find that the cost of switching occupations between sectors is 1.3-3.1 and 1.4-7 times
11Browning et al. (1985) use the British Family Expenditure Survey, a repeated cross section, to estimate a dynamic
model of consumption and saving.
12In fact, Deaton (1985) cites Sri Lanka as an example of a developing country with good-quality RCS data.
22
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 1
larger for males and females, respectively, than switching occupations within sectors. Therefore,
the switching costs estimated in this paper should be interpreted as a lower bound. This implies that
the economy’s adjustment to trade liberalization will be faster than it otherwise would be, meaning
that the adjustment costs should also be thought of as a lower bound. Fortunately, despite the likely
mismeasurement of switching costs, the simulated data from the SMM estimation matches well
with the true data. This implies that the assumptions made about switching may not be significantly
misleading.
4.3 Selection Bias
The model has endogenous selection into the five labor-market alternatives, giving rise to the pos-
sibility of selection bias in the estimated parameters. Correct identification of the parameters is
achieved from a combination of exclusion restrictions and distributional assumptions.
Wages in sector j = 1, 2, 3 are observed in the data only for individuals who chose to work
in that sector. Since it is unlikely that these individuals are a random sample of the population,
conventional OLS wage regressions would result in biased estimates. Instead, the wage parameters
are correctly identified from assuming a standard normal error term distribution and from including
variables in the utility functions that determine choices but not wages; e.g. number of children,
switching costs. Similarly, the parameters for school and home production utility are correctly
identified from the standard normal assumption for the error term distribution and from including
variables that do not enter these utility functions but do affect choices; e.g. work experience in
sectors j = 1, 2, 3.
Thus, the solution to the individual optimization problem serves the same purpose as a two-step
bias correction procedure in a reduced-form model, in that it provides the required sample selection
rules for identification.
4.4 Data Moments and Parameters
While it is difficult to mathematically prove identification of each individual parameter, it is possible




Choice probabilities and mean sector-specific wages help identify the wage parameters for each
sector j = 1, 2, 3. All three sets of moments are conditioned on age, year, and gender, while the
wage and choice moments are also conditioned on level of schooling. As mentioned above, condi-
tioning the choice probabilities on age and year provides the birth cohort instrument that identifies
the coefficients for sector-specific experience, while conditioning on gender and schooling level
identifies the coefficients for the gender dummy and years of schooling. The mean standard devia-
tion of sector-specific wages — conditioned on age, year, and sex — help identify the wage variance
parameters.
Choice probabilities and schooling level probabilities help identify the school utility parameters
and the school error variance parameter. Both sets of moments are conditioned on age, year, and
gender. Two of the four schooling levels are O’Level completion and A’Level completion, which
help identify the coefficients on the O’Level and A’Level dummies in the school utility function.
Choice probabilities also help identify the home production utility parameters and the home error
variance term. The choice probabilities for each alternative is conditioned on whether children aged
6 and below reside in the household, which helps identify the parameter for number of children in
the home utility function. In addition, the cohort choice probability profiles for sectors j = 1, 2, 3,
which tracks cohort sector-specific experience over time, provide an exclusion restriction for the
school and home utility parameters since sector-specific experience determines choices without
affecting school and home utility.
The switching probability moments for each sector j = 1, 2, 3 help identify the sector-specific
switching cost parameters. This set of moments is conditioned on age, year, gender, and education
level. In addition, the switching probability moments provide an exclusion restriction to help iden-
tify the wage, school and home parameters since prior choices affect current choices (because of
switching costs) without affecting any of the five utility functions.
5 Estimation
5.1 Simulated Method of Moments
The parameters of the five utility functions are estimated via simulated method of moments (SMM).
Specifically, the weighted sum of the squared differences between sample moments and moments
24
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 1
simulated by the model is minimized with respect to the parameters. The moment weights are
the inverse values of the estimated variances of the moments, thus assigning smaller weights to
moments with a higher variance. The time discount factor is set to δ = 0.97. The steps of the
estimation procedure are as follows:
1. Set up the starting distribution of individuals in 1920: This consists of a joint distribution
of age, gender, years of schooling, and sector-specific experience constructed to reflect a
population that is less educated than the 1992 distribution. Each birth cohort is represented
by 800 individuals weighted according to their cohort size.
2. Set up the entering distributions of 15-year-olds for each year in 1921-2009: This consists of
a joint distribution of gender, years of schooling, and number of children in the household.
Each entering distribution is progressively more educated with time.
3. Obtain the pre-determined time series of aggregate variables for 1920-2009: sector-specific
value added, labor income shares, and the Markov process for number of children
4. Guess an initial vector of parameters, Θ, for the utility and switching cost functions: To
obtain a ‘good’ initial guess, a reduced-form, two-step version of the discrete-choice model
is estimated (see Appendix C).13
5. Run the adaptive expectations estimation routine:
(a) For a given parameter vector, Θ, solve the Bellman equations for the choice problem,
imposing that individuals believe current skill prices persist forever.
(b) Simulate the economy forward from 1920 through 2009, replacing the oldest cohort
with a distribution of 15-year-olds, updating individual choices and state variables, and
computing the market-clearing skill prices, r∗jt.
(c) Compute the SMM criterion function, which is the weighted distance between simulated
and true data moments:
13Although the reduced-form estimation can neither include sector-specific work experience nor capture the utilities
derived from school and home production, it still provides a useful guideline as to the magnitudes and signs of the
structural utility function parameters.
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L(Θ) = (m(Θ)−m)′W−1(m(Θ)−m) (15)
where m(Θ) is the vector of simulated moments, m is the vector of true moments, and
W is a weighting matrix that consists of the diagonal elements of the empirical variance-
covariance matrix of the data moments. There are many more moments (93,600) than
parameters (54), so the model is over-identified. Standard chi-square tests for model fit
are conducted.
(d) Update the parameter vector using the parallel Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm of
Wiswall and Donghoon (2007). Then repeat steps 1 through 4 until a set of parameters,
Θ̂A, is found that minimizes L(·).
6. Compute the sequence of equilibrium skill price ratios, {
rj,t+1
rj,t
}2008t=1920, from the economy
governed by the parameter set Θ̂A.
7. Run the rational expectations estimation routine:




following for each time period t from 1920 through 2009:
i. Solve the Bellman equations for period t, imposing that individuals believe the




ii. Simulate the economy for period t, replacing the oldest cohort with a distribution
of 15-year-olds, updating individual choices and state variables, and computing the
market-clearing skill prices, r∗jt.
iii. Move the economy forward one year and repeat steps 1 through 3.
(b) Update the sequence of equilibrium skill price ratios and repeat steps 1 and 2 until the
price ratio converges.
(c) Compute the SMM criterion function.
(d) Update the parameter vector using the parallel Nelder-Mead algorithm. Then repeat




The parameter estimates and their standard errors are given in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The computation
method for the standard errors is described in Appendix B.
The human capital production function parameter estimates (Table 1) show that the returns to
schooling in manufacturing is higher than in agriculture and slightly lower than in services. This
implies that a permanent decline in manufacturing wages could reduce aggregate schooling invest-
ment, depending on the proportion of the workforce that moves into agriculture versus services.
The coefficients for work experience indicate that sector-specific experience accumulated in one
sector is transferable to other sectors, but only partially. Thus, switching sectors results in a wage
decline, creating a barrier to inter-sectoral mobility. The results also show that experience in both
agriculture and manufacturing are both more transferable to services. This perhaps reflects the very
broad range of industries and occupations that comprise the services sector. Thus, a permanent neg-
ative wage shock in manufacturing may result in a greater expansion of services than of agriculture.
As expected, human capital increases with age in all three sectors, reflecting the rewards to
overall labor market experience or general human capital. Male workers earn more than females,
receiving the highest premium in manufacturing and the lowest in services. This last result most
likely reflects the fact that many service sector industries employ a disproportionately large number
of women.14
The school utility parameters, given in Table 2, indicate that the utility from attending school
drops rapidly with age. While the finite horizon lifetime contributes to declining school attendance
with age, the strict age-structured pattern of the national schooling system is also a likely factor.
Obtaining an O’Level qualification, usually at age 15 or 16, is costly, as given by the negative
coefficient for the O’Level dummy. An A’Level qualification, usually obtained at age 18 or 19,
imposes an additional cost. These costs conform to the pattern of schooling achievement seen in
the data, with smaller proportions of people at higher levels of schooling.15 Utility increases with
education level, possibly capturing permanent and unobservable characteristics of the individuals
who persistently self-select into school.
14For example, the vast majority of nurses and teachers are women.




The utility attached to home production increases with age, is higher for women than for men,
and rises with the number of young children in the household. The larger utility value for women
helps explain the significant difference in labor force participation rates between men and women
at lower levels of schooling. More educated individuals derive higher utility from home production.
This may capture unobserved household or family characteristics; for example, individuals with
more education may have families with more wealth, and thus, have lower costs associated with not
working.
5.3 Model Fit
Tables 4 and 5 show that the model fits well with the data in terms of matching choice proportions
and mean wages. An additional test of the model is whether it can match features of the data that
were not utilized in the estimation. Three types of moments are evaluated here; the proportion of
individuals observed each year who have never been employed (Figure 5), the reservation wages of
the non-employed (Figure 6), and average wages by number of children in the household (Figure
7). As the figures indicate, the model performs well in matching these additional moments.
6 Policy Experiments
6.1 Initial Steady State
Before any policy experiments are conducted, the economy’s initial steady state is generated. This
ensures that the results of the policy experiments are independent of cohort-specific effects or other
unobserved time trends in the data. Once this initial steady state has been reached, the economy
is subjected to a trade policy “shock” and its transition to the new steady state is tracked. The
computations for long-run gains/losses and welfare are conducted from these transitional dynamics.
The estimated utility and switching parameters, Θ̂R, are fixed for all policy experiments.
The transition to the initial steady state begins from 2009, the last year of the data. Recall
that the estimation utilized available real value added data to determine equilibrium skill prices.
However, for the steady-state simulation, real value added and skill prices must now be computed
simultaneously in equilibrium along the economy’s transition path. Thus, some additional informa-
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tion is needed for 2009: the capital rental rate, rK , the sector-specific productivity parameters, Aj ,
and the domestic consumption shares in agriculture, manufacturing and services.
The capital rental rate, rK , is be computed using value added and the aggregate physical capital
stock. Data on the capital stock for 2009 is not available for Sri Lanka. However, data on annual
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is available for 1963-2009 from the World Bank Indicators,
the United Nations Statistical Division, and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Using the perpetual
inventory method, the aggregate capital stock for 2009, K2009, is computed using the GFCF time
series and an annual depreciation rate of 4% as given in Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993). Using
K2009, the economy-wide capital rental rate is computed as rK =
(1−0.6)Y2009
K2009
, where 0.6 is the
economy-wide labor income share. The sector-specific capital rental rates, rjK , are all assumed to
equal the economy-wide rental rate rK , which implies perfect capital mobility across sectors. The
rental rate is kept fixed at rK for the initial steady state simulation, and the sector-specific physical
capital stocks are determined in equilibrium such that rjK = rK .












j and µj is the share of domestic consumption on sector j output. For all
policy experiments, consumption shares are imposed as µ1 = 0.2, µ2 = 0.25, and µ3 = 0.55.
16
Normalizing the 2009 output prices to unity, pj,2009 = 1 for j = 1, 2, 3, the sector-specific







. For the simulation, the
productivity parameters are fixed at the 2009 values, while the agriculture and manufacturing output
prices, p1 and p2, are fixed throughout at unity. The output price of the non-tradeables (services)
sector, p3, adjusts in equilibrium.
To start off the simulation, the state variables of the 2009 population distribution is updated to
reflect the optimal choices made in 2009 during the estimation. As the economy evolves forward,
each entering generation is assumed to be identical to the distribution of 15-year-olds from 2009.
16Data on sector consumption shares is not available for Sri Lanka. Devereux and Lane (2006) calculate that the share
of non-tradeables in CPI in a developing country is around 0.55. The same is assumed for Sri Lanka in setting µ3 = 0.55.
The share of tradeables in CPI is then 0.45. It is assumed that the agriculture share is lower than the manufacturing share.
Thus, µ1 = 0.2 and µ2 = 0.25.
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This ensures that the results of the policy experiments are not dependent on any cohort-specific
features. Labor income shares, αj , are fixed at their 2009 values. The model is simulated long
enough until sector-specific value added, the physical and human capital stocks, and the equilibrium
skill prices are unvarying.
The initial steady state is generated in the following steps:
1. Move the economy forward by one year, replacing the oldest cohort with the distribution of
15-year-olds from 2009.
2. Solve the individual choice problem at the equilibrium values of sector-specific physical cap-
ital, Kjt, skill prices, rjt, and the services output price, p3t. Equilibrium is determined by the
following seven equations:
(a) The physical stocks are allocated in each sector such that the sector-specific rental rates






, j = 1, 2, 3 (17)




, j = 1, 2, 3 (18)
(c) The non-tradeables output price is determined such that a fixed fraction, µ3 = 0.55, of






Yjt(p̄) = Y3t (19)
where p̄ = [p1, p2, p3].
3. Record real value added, aggregate human capital, and physical capital for each sector. Repeat
steps 1 through 3 until these aggregate variables converge.
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Once the initial steady state is computed, the non-tradeables output price, p3, is reset to unity








, and is fixed at this
level for all policy experiments. The aggregate capital stock at the initial steady state, K̄, is also
fixed at that level for all policy experiments. Instead, the economy-wide rental rate, rK , is allowed
to adjust in equilibrium such that rjK = rK , j = 1, 2, 3 (i.e. capital is perfectly mobile across
sectors).
6.2 Trade Shock
The initial steady state is now shocked with a one-time 30% decline in the manufacturing output
price, from p2 = 1 to p2 = 0.7, that persists forever. The agriculture output price is fixed at
p1 = 1, while the non-tradeables output price is allowed to adjust in equilibrium. Figure 8 shows the
transition of output prices, skill prices, choice proportions, sector-specific capital stock, aggregate
real output and real welfare from the initial to the final steady state.
The decline in p2 is accompanied by a decline in the equilibrium manufacturing skill price,
r∗2. Since wages are a positive function of skill prices, wj = rjhj , manufacturing wages also fall,
resulting in a net outflow of labor from manufacturing. In contrast, employment in agriculture and
services increase. Consequently, the capital rental price in manufacturing is pushed downwards in
manufacturing and upwards in agriculture and services. Thus, physical capital reallocates away
from manufacturing and into the remaining two sectors.
The services output price — which adjusts in equilibrium — also declines, causing the overall
price level to fall. This is because the initial decline in manufacturing wages lowers aggregate
demand, and thus, by equation 19, pushes down the non-tradeables price. Because of this decline
in output prices — and thus wages — in manufacturing and services, a larger proportion of people
opt into home production, reducing aggregate employment in the short-run. However, the fall in
output prices dominates the decline in overall employment such that aggregate demand rises on net,
increasing real output sharply in the short run. Because the return to schooling is relatively high in
the adversely affected sector, enrollment in schooling declines initially.
Although the labor market’s short-run response is large, the economy takes about 40 years to
reach the new steady state. The short-run labor exodus from manufacturing raises the manufacturing
skill price, causing manufacturing employment to rise again in the long run, though it remains well
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below its pre-shock level. A similar incomplete reversal occurs in the other two sectors. The initial
rise in the agriculture skill price is partially reversed as more people move into agriculture. This
somewhat reverses the rise in agriculture employment, although it remains higher than its pre-shock
level. As a result of the drop in the equilibrium services output price, the services skill price also
falls initially, and continues to fall as labor moves from manufacturing into services. However, as the
manufacturing skill price and employment level rises again, the movement of labor into the services
sector halts and partially reverses itself, causing the services skill price to rise again in the long run,
though never reverting to its pre-shock level. Thus, the labor market variables show non-monotonic
transitions following the trade shock.
Figure 9 shows the evolution of skill premia computed for different pairs of the four major ed-
ucation levels. For all pairs expect the two lowest education levels, the skill premium falls at first,
then takes on an inverted U shape before settling to a higher steady state level. For the two low-
est education level pairs, the skill premium takes a U shape before converging to almost the same
steady state level as before. These non-monotonicities can be reconciled with two aspects of the
model acting in tandem. The first is that individuals optimally invest in human capital at the start of
the lifetime. Thus, the initial decline in skill premia is because a disproportionately large number
of high-skill workers suffered a wage loss since they had self-selected into the manufacturing sector
because of their higher skill levels. As a result, the wage gap narrows at first. The second is that
manufacturing is the ‘middle-skill’ sector. With the decline of the middle-skill sector, new genera-
tions sort into the low-skill agricultural sector and the high-skill service sector; in other words, they
sort into greater skill extremes. This simultaneous up-and-down sorting widens the wage gap until
the services output price and all skill prices converge to their new steady state levels. Figures 8
and 10 also show that the services sector absorbs a larger share of the economy’s capital stock and
highest skill workers.
Long-run Gains
The long-run aggregate gains/losses resulting from the trade policy can be computed in two ways. If
the main policy target is output, then it suffices to compare the levels of real output at the initial and
final steady states. However, if the policy target is welfare, then comparison of steady-state output
levels is inadequate because it ignores the utilities of individuals who do not work as well as the
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switching costs incurred by those who changed sectors. Aggregate welfare at any time t is defined
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It is assumed that domestic households own the economy’s capital stock. Thus, total income
earned by households is the sum of labor income and capital income in each sector, which is simply








(1− αj)Yjt = Yt.
Denote as WF and WI aggregate welfare at any given time period in the initial and final steady
states, respectively. If the economy’s response to the trade shock were instantaneous, then the
economy jumps from the initial to the final steady state, the assumption of classical theory. If so,













The first column of Table 6 shows that aggregate real output and aggregate welfare increase by
6.36% and 9.16%, respectively. This is because the economy’s price level is permanently lower
after the tariff reduction, causing real output and real wages to increase. With more purchasing
power for households, aggregate welfare is higher in the new steady state.
Adjustment Path
The above welfare calculations are based on the classical assumption that the economy adjusts
instantly to the policy change. Therefore, these gains can be thought of potential gains. However,
the economy requires a 40-year adjustment period before arriving at the new steady state. The








where Wt is defined as in equation 20. The actual long-run gain is thus
1
1−δ (WA −WI). The total


















The second column of Table 6 gives the transition cost in terms of both aggregate output and
welfare, expressed as a percentage of the long-run potential gains. In terms of both output and
welfare, transition costs eat up about 22% of the long-run gains to trade.
Welfare Gains without Endogenous Education
This experiment is geared to show the importance of endogenous education investment in determin-
ing the transition costs following trade liberalization. Education levels of agents are pre-determined,
as assumed in the prior literature. Specifically, each year, all agents age 15 through 65 are assumed
to have the same distribution of schooling as the 2009 population in the LFS. Note that in the com-




Table 7 shows the long-run gains and transition costs. The first column shows that aggregate
real output and aggregate welfare increase by 14.57% and 16.0%, respectively. However, the second
column shows that transition costs consume 30% and 31% of the long-run gains in output and
welfare, respectively; that is, the welfare loss is larger by about 8 percentage points compared to the
case with education investment.
Why are the long-run potential welfare gains larger without education investment? It is because
the trade-induced decline in human capital prices no longer has a negative impact on education
investment. With a smaller human capital scarcity in the economy, the upward pressure on the
wage-skill premium in the medium run is dampened as well. The education investment of new
generations is no longer negatively affected by the rise in wage-skill premia, which means that the
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‘pecuniary’ externality that generates an underinvestment of human capital is now smaller. Thus,
the economy has a higher level of human capital in the new steady state compared to the situation
with education investment. Higher human capital stocks translate to higher real output, and thus,
welfare.
However, as discussed above, comparative statics analyses inflate the true gains from trade.
Without education investment, a crucial margin of adjustment to the policy change is shut down.
As a result, a larger percentage of the long-run potential gains is now lost during transition; this
is shown in the second column of Table 7.17 Thus, studies that disallow education investment are
likely to significantly overestimate the actual gains from trade.
Finally, as noted above, the variation in the wage-skill premium during the transition is much
smaller without education investment. This suggests that endogenous human capital might explain
the mixed empirical evidence on wage-skill premia in developing countries. Given the long tran-
sition length calculated in this paper and others, the adjustment phase in response to trade policy
may well be ongoing even for those countries that liberalized in the late 1970s (e.g. Sri Lanka) and
early 1980s (e.g. Mexico). This suggests that the time periods chosen are crucial for the compara-
tive statics analyses typically conducted to evaluate trade reforms. These results also highlight that
comparative statics analyses fail to capture the non-monotonic dynamics of labor market variables,
partcularly the skill premium.
Individual Welfare Changes
The lifetime welfare of any individual i is the present discount value of his utility, net of switching






Denote as W iA and W
i
I the lifetime welfare with and without the trade shock, respectively, for
an individual i who was alive in year t = 0 when the trade shock occurred. His welfare change from
the trade shock is defined as W iI −W
i
A.
17Dix-Carneiro (2013) finds an analogous result for physical capital mobility. When he assumes zero capital mobility
across sectors, he finds that the transition consumes a much larger share of long-run gains than under perfect capital
mobility. This is because zero capital mobility shuts down one of the adjustment mechanisms of the economy in response
to a policy change.
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Table 8 gives the average welfare changes of individuals who were employed in manufactur-
ing at the time of the trade shock. The welfare changes are expressed as a percentage of W iI , the
pre-shock level of welfare. Overall, manufacturing workers experience a 13.2% loss of the lifetime
welfare they would have enjoyed if the trade shock had not occurred. Welfare losses vary consider-
ably across age and education level. Low-educated workers (less than a O’Level qualification) from
the youngest age group, 15-29, experience the smallest welfare loss, while high-educated workers
(at least a O’Level qualification) from the oldest age group, 45-65, experience the largest loss.
Overall, welfare losses are largest for older workers. This is because they have accumulated
more sector-specific experience in manufacturing, thus experience greater wage losses when p2
falls. The direct costs of switching sectors also increase with age, meaning that even without sector-
specific experience, older workers are less mobile. Moreover, because of the finite horizon, older
workers have less time in which to invest in new human capital.
Welfare losses are larger for high-educated workers. Because the returns to schooling are rel-
atively high in manufacturing, high-educated manufacturing workers experience a larger drop in
their wages. Moreover, while low-educated workers can switch into agriculture, high-educated
workers would prefer to switch into services, whose schooling returns are higher than in manufac-
turing. However, while the agriculture output price remains fixed at its global level, the services
output price decreases in equilibrium, pushing down the services skill price. Thus, high-educated
manufacturing workers experience a larger drop in lifetime welfare since most of them switch into
services.
Table 9 shows the welfare changes for all individuals who were alive at the time of the shock,
not just those who were employed in manufacturing. Overall, individuals experience a welfare gain
of 8.4%. Workers in the middle age range, 30-44, experience the largest gains, 20-21% for both
low- and high-educated workers. Young workers (age 15-29) also experience a welfare gain, while
the oldest workers (age 45-65) experience a welfare loss. That welfare gains are highest for the
middle age group, instead of the youngest, may at first seem strange. However, note that real wages
in the economy rise as a result of the decline in the price level. Middle-aged workers, who have
accumulated more human capital than younger workers, experience a large increase in real wages.
The welfare increase resulting from a higher real wage dominates the welfare loss resulting from
lower inter-sectoral mobility for these middle-aged workers.
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Low-educated individuals overall fare better than high-educated workers. Again, as explained
above, this is because the adversely affected sector pays relatively high returns to schooling, while
the sector with the highest rewards to schooling — services — experiences a large skill price decline.
6.3 Labor Market Policies
Three labor policies are evaluated: a schooling subsidy, an employment subsidy for the services
sector, and a vocational training subsidy for the services sector. The individuals targeted are those
who were employed in the manufacturing sector at the time of trade liberalization. The policies are
evaluated for their impact on the speed of adjustment, and on aggregate and individual welfare.
All three policies are intended to encourage re-employment in the services sector. The services
sector has been gradually expanding in Sri Lanka, while agriculture has been shrinking. More-
over, the transitional dynamics following the trade shock show that labor reallocation favors the
services sector over agriculture. Thus, it is expected that further trade liberalization in Sri Lanka
will expand the services sector even more, while agriculture continues to shrink. In addition, the
vocational training programs implemented by Sri Lanka’s central government are geared towards
services sector employment.
Experiment I: Education Subsidy
Eligible workers receive a subsidy to invest in education for up to 10 years starting from the time of
the trade shock. Only individuals who were employed in the manufacturing sector at the time of the
shock are eligible.18 The program’s expiration is known to all individuals; i.e. the 10-year program
duration is built into individuals’ expectations when they solve their Bellman equations.
The subsidy is sponsored by a lump-sum income tax. Specifically, starting from t = 0 through
t = 9, a fraction, ψ, of aggregate real output is transferred to eligible individuals who choose to
attend school. Because real output is determined in equilibrium, the total transfer amount is also
determined in equilibrium: Ψ = ψY . Each eligible individual who chooses schooling receives the
18The subsidy can be thought of as financial assistance to obtain a certificate, diploma or degree in information tech-
nology, management, business, marketing, accountancy, and similar programs that have been available in Sri Lanka since
the 1990s. Most of these programs are run by local and foreign private institutions, and receive state accreditation. They
typically target young adults who have completed O’Levels or A’Levels and are looking to hone a specific set of skills to
find employment in Sri Lanka’s growing services sectors. These programs also provide a key higher-education alternative
to the state-run universities which are capacity constrained and often undermined by political unrest.
37
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 1





Therefore, s is also determined in equilibrium. The tax rate, ψ, is set to decrease over time. This
is because the majority of eligible workers who choose the subsidy do so at the beginning of the
program; that is, n falls over the 10 years of the program.19 After some experimentation, ψ is set to
0.01% of output at t = 0 and declines linearly to zero by t = 10.
Figure 11 shows the transitions of aggregate output and welfare for all labor market policies.
The education subsidy initially lowers output compared to the no-policy benchmark since some
individuals who would have chosen to work are attending school instead. However, the resulting
increase in human capital raises output after the subsidy programs ends. The economy reaches its
new steady state faster than without the subsidy. Aggregate welfare is also higher with the subsidy
than without.
Tables 11 and 12 give the welfare changes for low- and high-educated manufacturing workers.
Compared to the no-policy benchmark, both low- and high-educated manufacturing workers in the
youngest age group (15-29) experience a smaller welfare loss as a result of the subsidy. However,
middle-aged and older workers do not benefit, and in fact, are slightly worse off. Because the utility
from attending school falls rapidly with age, middle-aged and older workers do not find it optimal
to enroll in an educational program. They are worse off because the lump-sum transfer of income,
Ψ = ψY , benefits young individuals while taxing older workers.
Experiment II: Employment Subsidy
Under this program, eligible workers receive a subsidy, s, if they move directly into the services
sector. Again, eligible workers are those who were employed in manufacturing at the time of the
trade shock. The employment subsidy is sponsored by a lump-sum income tax with the same declin-
ing tax rate sequence as for the education subsidy. Total tax revenue, Ψ = ψY , and the individual
subsidy amount, s = Ψ
n
are determined in equilibrium. The program lasts 10 years and its duration
is known to all individuals.
The employment subsidy results in a larger reallocation of manufacturing workers into the ser-
vices sector compared to the no-policy benchmark. Correspondingly, output increases relative to
19If ψ were kept constant over time, the individual subsidy amount, s, would be extremely large in the last few years of




the no-policy benchmark during the 10 years of the program (Figure 11). After the program ex-
pires, growth in aggregate output slows down initially because the utility from services employment
is no longer as high, thus raising the relative value of other alternatives such as home production.
However, output is still higher than in the no-policy benchmark and steady-state output is reached
faster. The employment subsidy has a smaller positive impact on aggregate welfare than the educa-
tion subsidy. This is because the latter directly increases the economy’s human capital stock for up
to 10 years, while the former only subsidizes a one-time switching of sectors.
Tables 11 and 12 show that the employment subsidy reduces the welfare loss incurred by man-
ufacturing workers, even resulting in a gain for the youngest workers. Low-educated, middle-aged
workers also experience a small welfare gain. Young, low-educated workers benefit the most from
the subsidy. Overall, manufacturing workers are much better compensated by the employment sub-
sidy than the education subsidy.
Experiment III: Vocational Training Subsidy
In this experiment, eligible workers face a sixth labor market alternative. They can now choose to
obtain one year of vocational training in the services sector.20 The skills thus obtained are equivalent
to an additional three years of sector-specific experience in services. After completion of one year of
training, individuals are no longer eligible for the program. The flow utility received from training is
just 50% of the flow utility received from home production. Thus, the government offers a subsidy
to compensate for this utility loss. As before, the subsidy is sponsored by a lump-sum income tax
with the individual subsidy determined in equilibrium. The program is offered for 10 years and this
duration is known to all workers.
Figure 11 shows that, as with the education subsidy, the vocational training program reduces
output initially compared to the no-policy benchmark. This is because some individuals who would
have otherwise worked are now engaged in training. The fall in output is greater than that for the
education subsidy. While the education subsidy is used almost exclusively by young individuals,
training is chosen by middle-aged and older individuals as well. Thus, more people overall choose
vocational training, resulting in lower employment and output during the program’s tenure. How-
20The Sri Lankan government began implementing vocational training programs in the 1990s, more than a decade
after the country’s initial trade reform. By the 1990s, it had become clear that workers did not have the required skills
demanded in the post-liberalization economy in which the services sector had expanded considerably.
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ever, once the program expires, output jumps up to a higher level than under the education subsidy,
and remains higher until steady state is reached. This is both because more people undertake train-
ing than schooling, and because the return to sector-specific experience is higher (β37 = 0.0954)
than the return to schooling (β33 = 0.0726) in the services sector. As for welfare, steady state is
reached fastest under the vocational training program. In fact, welfare under vocational training
is higher at every point in the transition period than for any of the other policies (including the
no-policy benchmark).
Tables 11 and 12 show that the training program significantly reduces welfare losses incurred by
manufacturing workers, even resulting in gains for young workers. Young, low-educated workers
benefit the most from the training program since they already had relatively low mobility costs.
7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the short-, medium- and long-run response of endogenous human capital in-
vestment in a small open economy that experiences a one-time, exogenous decline in the manu-
facturing output price, as would occur with a tariff reduction. The theoretical framework allows
for an explicit link between private human capital investment decisions and equilibrium aggregate
variables — labor supply, wages, output, and welfare — across time.
The experiment is conducted in several steps. First, a dynamic, multi-sector, general equilibrium
model of the labor market is estimated with cross-sectional data from Sri Lanka, a small open
economy. The model framework is adapted from Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee (2005), and
features overlapping generations, heterogeneous and forward-looking individuals, switching costs,
and self selection. Because the data set is a repeated cross section (RCS), pseudo-panel methods are
used in the estimation, as in Browning et al. (1985) and Deaton (1985).
Second, the estimated model is used to simulate a trade ‘shock’, a permanent decline in the
manufacturing output price. The results show that both education investment and the skill premium
evolve non-monotonically during the transition. The manufacturing tariff cut puts downward pres-
sure on skill investment and the skill premium. However, as workers start moving out of manufac-
turing in the short and medium run, the skill premium starts widening. Over time, new generations
enter the labor market, some entering the low-skill agriculture sector and a larger proportion en-
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tering the high-skill non-tradeables sector. Physical capital reallocates into agriculture and a larger
proportion into non-tradeables.Because of worker self-selection into the two skill extremes of agri-
culture and services, the new steady state skill premium is higher than before the trade reform took
place.
The potential long-run gains to aggregate output and welfare are 9% and 5%, respectively, but
the time-consuming transition consumes about 22% of these potential gains. While individuals
employed in manufacturing at the time of trade reform experience large welfare losses, the aver-
age individual enjoys a welfare gain. Shutting off endogenous education investment consumes an
additional 8% of potential long-run gains, while the skill premium shows less variation over time.
A balanced-budget subsidy that targets education investment or vocational training in the non-
tradeables sector speeds up the transition, increases aggregate welfare, and reduces the individual
welfare losses of manufacturing workers. However, the education subsidy disproportionately ben-
efits the youngest individuals. In contrast, a moving subsidy that assists manufacturing workers
improves welfare for those workers and speeds up the transition, but decreases aggregate welfare.
Overall, these results yield two key observations. First, the endogenous adjustment of skill
is an important determinant of post-liberalization outcomes in developing countries. Contrary to
classical theory, both skill investment and the skill premium can rise or fall during different phases
of the transition process, depending on the speed at which individuals switch sectors and invest in
human capital. Second, short-run policies that directly encourage skill investment in the expanding
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search Forum Working Papers 913, 2009.
E. Artuc, S. Chaudhuri, and J. McLaren. Trade shocks and labor adjustment: A structural empirical
approach. American Economic Review, 100(3):1008–45, 2010.
E. Blanchard and G. Willmann. Trade, education, and the shrinking middle class. Bielefeld Working
Papers in Economics and Management No. 03-2013, 2013.
M. Browning, A. Deaton, and M. Irish. A profitable approach to labor supply and commodity
demands over the life cycle. Econometrica, 53(3):503–543, 1985.
K. Cosar. Adjusting to trade liberalization: Reallocation and labor market policies. Working paper,
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, January 2013.
F. Cunha, J. Heckman, and S. Schennach. Estimating the technology of cognitive and noncognitive
skill formation. NBER Working Paper No. 15664, 2010.
C. Davidson and S. Matusz. Trade and turnover: Theory and evidence. Review of International
Economics, 13(5):861–880, 2005.
A. Deaton. Panel data from time series of cross sections. Journal of Econometrics, 30:109–126,
1985.
M. Devereux and P. Lane. Exchange rates and monetary policy in emerging market economies.
Economic Journal, 116:478–506, 2006.
R. Dix-Carneiro. Trade liberalization and labor market dynamics. Working paper, Department of
Economics, Duke University, February 2013.
E. Edmonds and N. Pavcnik. Product market integration and household labor supply in a poor
economy: Evidence from vietnam. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3234, 2004.
42
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 1
P. Goldberg and N. Pavcnik. Distributional effects of trade liberalization in developing countries.
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(1):39–82, 2007.
D. Gollin. Getting income shares right. Journal of Political Economy, 110(2):458–474, April 2002.
G. Grossman and E. Helpman. Endogenous innovation in the theory of growth. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 8(1):23–44, 1994.
J. Hall. Within and across country inequality in a model of trade and endogenous growth. Working
paper, Department of Economics, University of Tampa, 2010.
E. Helpman and O. Itskhoki. Labor market rigidities, trade and unemployment. Review of Economic
Studies, 77(3):1100–1137, 2009.
E. Helpman, O. Itskhoki, and S. Redding. Trade and labor market outcomes. NBER Working Paper
No. 16662, January 2011.
M. Keane and K. Wolpin. The career decisions of young men. The Journal of Political Economy,
105(3):473–522, 1997.
L. Kletzer. Imports, exports and jobs: What does trade mean for employment and job loss? W.E.
Upjohns Institute for Employment Research, 2002.
B. Kovak. Regional effects of trade reform: What is the correct measure of liberalization? American
Economic Review, 103(5):1960–1976, 2013.
C. Lai. Trade liberalization and human capital formation in developing countries. Working paper,
Department of Economics, Hong Kong Baptist University, 2010.
D. Lee. An estimable dynamic general equilibrium model of work, schooling and occupation choice.
International Economic Review, 46(1):1–34, 2005.
D. Lee and K. Wolpin. Inter-sectoral labor mobility and the growth of the service sector. Econo-
metrica, 74(1):1–46, 2006.
L. Lee and R. Trost. Technical training and earnings: A polychotomous choice model with selec-
tivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 66(1):151–156, 1984.
43
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 1
D. McFadden. Analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In P. Zarembka, editor, Econometrics. New
York: Academic Press, New York, 1974.
J. McLaren and S. Hakobyan. Looking for local labor market effects of nafta. NBER Working
Paper No. 16535, 2010.
M. Melitz. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity.
Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725, 2003.
M. Michaely, D. Papageorgiou, and A. Choksi. Liberalizing Foreign Trade: Lessons of Experience
in the Developing World, volume 7. Blackwell, 1997.
R. Moffitt. Identification and estimation of dynamic models with a time series of repeated cross
sections. Journal of Econometrics, 59:99–123, 1993.
V. Nehru and A. Dhareshwar. A new database on physical capital stock: Sources, methodology and
results. Revista de Analisis Economica, 8(1):37–59, 1993.
N. Pavcnik, O. Attanasio, and P. Goldberg. Trade reforms and wage inequality in colombia. Journal
of Development Economics, 74(2):331–366, 2004a.
N. Pavcnik, P. Goldberg, and N. Schady. Trade liberalization and industry wage structure: Evidence
from brazil. The World Bank Economic Review, 18(3):319–344, 2004b.
A. Revenga. Exporting jobs? the impact of import competition on employment and wages in u. s.
manufacturing. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1):255–284, 1992.
D. Robbins. Evidence on trade and wages in the developing world. OECD Development Centre
Technical Papers, 119, 1996.
D. Trefler. The long and short of the canada-u. s. free trade agreement. American Economic Review,
94(4):870–895, 2004.
J. Tybout. Manufacturing firms in developing countries: How well they do, and why? Journal of
Economic Literature, 38(1):11–44, 2000.
M. Wiswall and L. Donghoon. A parallel implementation of the simplex function minimization
rouine. Computational Economics, 30(2):171–187, September 2007.
44
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 1
A. Wood. Openness and wage inequality in developing countries: The latin american challenge to
east asian conventional wisdom. The World Bank Economic Review, 11(1):33–57, 1997.
S. Zhu and D. Trefler. Ginis in general equilibrium: Trade, technology and southern inequality.
NBER Working Paper No. 8446, 2001.
45
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 1
A Solving the Bellman Equations
At any age a, an individual chooses the alternative that maximizes the utility he expects to derive
for the remainder of his lifetime, age a + 1 through 64. That is, he must compute EV Ω(a + 1).
Thus, prior to simulating the model in the estimation routine and policy experiments, the choice
problem must be solved for the heterogeneous individuals in the data. As described in section 2, the
choice problem can be depicted in Bellman form and solved via backward recursion, starting from
the terminal age, 65.
Two computational difficulties arise in solving the Bellman equations. First, because individ-
uals must form expectations about future utility shocks, computing the value functions requires a
five-dimensional integration over the joint distribution of shocks. This is accomplished via Monte






is computed for each shock vector, ǫ. Then, EV Ω(a) is approximated as the





across the utility shock draws.
The second computational difficulty arises from the large number of achievable states that the
individual must consider when computing his value functions. Since computing EV j(Ω(a) is not
feasible for several million state space points, the interpolation method of Keane and Wolpin (1997)
is employed. Specifically, for each age a, EV j(Ω(a) is computed only for a subset of feasible state
vectors, {Ω(a)}. The resulting set of expected values, {EV j(Ω(a)} values are then regressed on
the corresponding state variables in {Ω(a)}. The regression coefficients are used to approximate
the expected values of the remaining states.
To describe the solution algorithm, first define as Ω̃t(a) an individual’s state vector at time t
without utility shocks:
Ω̃t(a) = (Exp1 + 1, Exp2, Exp3, Educ,Kids(a), Sector, r̄t)
where r̄t represents the sequence of current and future equilibrium sector-specific skill prices that
the individual will face from now until age 65. As described in section 2, for the purpose of im-
plementing the model, r̄t is written solely in terms of the current sector-specific skill prices, rjt,
j = 1, 2, 3. Thus, from a computational standpoint, r̄t is actually a 3x1 vector.
The solution algorithm is run separately for each gender g as follows:
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1. For a = 65, randomly select N = 500 feasible state vectors:
{Ω̃nt (a) = {(Exp1 + 1, Exp2, Exp3, Educ,Kids(a), Sector, r̄t)}
N
n=1
2. For each state vector n, draw 200 utility shocks from the joint distribution ǭ and compute
EV Ωnt (a) using the Monte Carlo method described above.
3. Regress {EV Ωnt (a)}
N
n=1 on a complete second-order polynomial function of {Ω̃
n
t (a)}:
EV Ωnt (a) =
exp(δ0+δ1Exp1+1++δ2Exp2+δ3Exp3+δ4Educ+δ5Kids(a)+δ6r̄t+δ7Sector)+G
where G is a set of square and cross terms. The coefficient estimates are then used to approx-
imate EV Ωt(a) for the remaining state vectors for age 65.
4. Use the Bellman equations specified in Section 2 to repeat steps 1 through 3 for all ages 64
through 16.
The interpolation regression provides a good fit of the value functions to the state variables; the
R-squared values are 0.97 or above for each age and gender.
B Weighting Matrix and Standard Errors
The simulated method of moments (SMM) estimation procedure minimizes the weighted distance
between the simulated and actual moments. Let Xik be i
th observation of the kth moment, and let
Nk be the number of individuals that comprise the k







which is the mean conditional moment computed from the LFS data. Denote the corresponding
simulated moment as msk(θ). The SMM estimation procedure finds the parameter vector, θ, that





. Note that each moment is scaled by 1
mk
, the true moment. This ensures that all moments
are within a narrow range of values.
The vector of moment conditions is:
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g(θ) = [g1(θ), g2(θ), ..., gK(θ)]
where K in the total number of moments used. The objective function to be minimized is:
L(θ) = g(θ)′Wg(θ)
Following Lee and Wolpin (2006), two assumptions are made with regard to the weighting
matrix:
1. W is diagonal




where σ2k is the sample variance of the k
th moment.
As mentioned in Section 5, the estimation is conducted in two stages. Correspondingly, the
weighting matrix W is computed twice:
1. In the first stage, which assumes adaptive expectations, it is assumed that σ2k = 1 and each
k sample moment is weighted by Nk. Thus, the diagonal elements of W consists of the K
values of Nk. Let θ̂A be the first-stage estimate of θ.





Each k sample moment is weighted by Nk
σ2
k
. Thus, the diagonal elements of W consists of the




The variance covariance matrix of the parameter estimates is defined as V = (D′WD)−1,
whereD is the matrix of partial derivatives of the moments with respect to each parameter andW is
the weighting matrix computed in the second stage. The standard errors of the parameter estimates
are the square roots of the diagonal elements of V .
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C Reduced Form Estimation
To begin the SMM estimation procedure, an initial guess of the structural parameters must be tested.
A good initial guess is important in preventing the parameter search algorithm from getting perma-
nently ‘stuck’ near a ‘bad’ local minimum. To obtain a good starting guess, a simple reduced-form
version of the structural choice model is estimated. While this simpler model fails to capture many
of the aspects of the structural model, it nevertheless provides an idea of the magnitudes and signs
of the structural parameters.
The reduced form model is adapted from Lee and Trost (1984) and is implemented in two stages.
In the first stage, the utility attached to each of the J = 5 labor market alternatives is estimated. Just
as in the structural model, the five alternatives are agriculture, manufacturing, services, school, and
home production. In the second stage, the wage equations for each of the three sectors are estimated
using a selection correction term computed in the first stage.




whereX is a vector of individual characteristics and year dummies, β is a vector of coefficients, and
ǫij is an idiosyncratic shock that is iid and drawn from an extreme-value distribution (McFadden,








The coefficients βj are estimated via maximum likelihood. The estimated coefficients are then




, s = 1, 2, 3
where φ is the standard normal density function, Φ is the standard normal distribution function, and
G(β̂′jX) = ΦF (β̂
′
jX).




Wj = γjY + δjλj + ξj , j = 1, 2, 3 (25)
The estimation results for the choice and wage equations are given in Tables C.1 and C.2. The
choice model was estimated with sector 1 (agriculture) as the base alternative. Therefore, the sector
1 utility parameters, β1, are all normalized to 1. The remaining utility coefficients are measured
relative to β1.
D Capital Stock and Productivity Growth
The model can be used to conduct additional counterfactual experiments that measure the impact
of trade-induced foreign direct investment (FDI) and productivity growth, both of which have been
offered as explanations for rising skill premia in post-liberalization developing countries. In one
experiment, the aggregate capital stock is allowed to grow starting from the time of the trade lib-
eralization until it is 10% larger than its initial steady state value. As before, capital is perfectly
mobile. Figure D.1 shows that this increased quantity of capital allocates into manufacturing and
services, with agriculture experiencing capital outflow. The economy-wide skill premium — mea-
sured for education levels 3 and 4 versus 1 and 2 — is higher throughout the transition period and at
the new steady state. This is not surprising since capital moved into the high-skill sectors and away
from the low-skill sector.
In the second experiment, manufacturing productivity (A2) is allowed to grow starting from the
time of the trade reform until it is 10% larger than its initial steady state value. As shown in Figure
D.1, the reallocation of capital favors manufacturing even more than in the first experiment. The skill
premium shows a similarly large increase as in the previous experiment. Thus, the results conform to
empirical evidence that trade liberalization combined with increases capital and technology results
in greater wage inequality because these inputs disproportionately favor the high-skill sectors where
capital has higher returns.
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E The Role of Expectations
The above policy experiments were conducted assuming that individuals have rational expectations
about future skill prices. This may have important implications for adjustment costs. Figure 8 shows
that the manufacturing skill price gradually falls following the trade shock, and recovers slightly as
the economy approaches steady state. This partial recovery occurs because the exodus of labor
from manufacturing raises the return to human capital in that sector. Under rational expectations,
individuals correctly predict that skill prices gradually fall and recover. Thus, some manufacturing
workers who experience a wage decline after the trade shock may nevertheless opt to remain in
manufacturing, because they build into their value functions the (correct) assumption that skill prices
will rise again.
On the other hand, if individuals did not have perfect foresight, they will assume that the drop
in the manufacturing skill price persists for some time. With static expectations, they will assume
that the lower skill price will persist forever. This may compel more workers to exit manufacturing
and incur switching costs at the beginning of the transition, and perhaps even re-enter at a later date
once skill prices rise again. The implication is that without perfect foresight, movements in and out
sectors may be higher, resulting in larger adjustment costs.
To test this conjecture, the economy’s response to the trade policy shock is simulated under
static expectations. Figure E.1 shows the evolution of output prices, sector choice proportions, and
skill prices under static versus rational expectations. Under static expectations, the labor movement
out of manufacturing overshoots at the start of the transition, with employment rising again after
about 10 years. Consequently, employment in services and agriculture overshoots in the first 10
years. The variation in skill prices over time is larger as a result. The services output price shows a
large decline before rising again to its new steady-state value.
Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3 show the aggregate and individual adjustment costs for the economy
under adaptive expectations. Under adaptive expectations, adjustment costs consume over 27% of
the long-run potential gains to trade, compared to 22% under rational expectations. Manufacturing
workers experience a greater welfare decline under adaptive expectations: 18% compared to 13%
under rational expectations. Taking all individuals in the economy, the lifetime welfare gain is 5.8%
as opposed to 8.4% under rational expectations.
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These results suggest that the efficacy of different labor market policies in reducing welfare
losses and/or speeding up adjustment depends on whether expectations fall under perfect foresight,
static, or something in between these two extremes. While the inter-sectoral movement out of
manufacturing is too large at the beginning of the transition under static expectations, it also means
that switchers incur large welfare losses. Therefore, a larger employment subsidy is needed to
compensate the switchers, but is likely to increase aggregate adjustment costs since the subsidy




Table 1: Sector-specific Human Capital: parameter estimates
Variable Agriculture Manufacturing Services
(age− 14) 0.0430 0.0341 0.0242
(0.00007) (0.00034) (0.00019)
(age− 14)2 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0011
(0.000079) (0.000074) (0.000081)
Educ 0.0479 0.0703 0.0726
(0.000012) (0.000010) (0.000002)
Male 0.1780 0.2303 0.1053
(0.00155) (0.00016) (0.00026)
Exp1 0.1073 0.0223 0.0349
(0.00014) (0.00035) (0.00029)
Exp2 0.0302 0.0978 0.0410
(0.00051) (0.000194) (0.00011)
Exp3 0.0340 0.0413 0.0954
(0.00036) (0.00045) (0.000081)
SD of shock 0.5717 0.5523 0.7076
(0.00028) (0.00062) (0.00063)




(age− 14) 0.0003 0.0378
(0.000018) (0.000045)






O′Level = 1 -0.5631
(0.0022)








Table 3: Switching Costs: parameter estimates
Variable Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Constant 1.85 1.47 1.21
(0.0650) (0.0096) (0.0431)
(age− 14) 0.0052 0.0023 0.0011
(0.00088) (0.00122) (0.00065)
(age− 14)2 -0.00010 -0.00013 -0.00009
(0.000019) (0.000032) (0.000011)
Male -0.022 -0.041 -0.005
(0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0008)
Table 4: Model vs. Data: choice proportions (%), 1992-2009
Data Reduced Form Model Structural Model
Agriculture 19.27 19.02 19.44
Manufacturing 9.09 8.26 10.02
Services 25.66 26.13 26.02
School 10.58 10.78 10.08
HomeProduction 35.40 35.81 34.44
Table 5: Model vs. Data: mean log wages, 1992-2009
Data Reduced Form Model Structural Model
Agriculture 2.964 3.067 3.058
Manufacturing 3.369 3.392 3.446
Services 3.645 3.444 3.707
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Table 6: Long-run Welfare
Long-run Gain (%) % of Long-run Gain Lost
Welfare 9.16 22.38
GDP 6.36 22.06
Table 7: Long-run Welfare: without endogenous education
Long-run Gain (%) % of Long-run Gain Lost
Welfare 16.0 30.52
GDP 14.57 30.94
Table 8: Welfare Changes: Manufacturing Workers
All 13.2466
Low Educ High Educ
Age 15-29 2.3165 13.0154
Age 30-44 5.8336 11.3714
Age 45-65 9.9713 21.8148
Table 9: Welfare Changes: All Individuals
All -8.4335
Low Educ High Educ
Age 15-29 -13.6596 -6.8692
Age 30-44 -21.1321 -20.4988
Age 45-65 1.4750 13.2613
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Table 10: Long-run Welfare under Different Labor Market Policies
Long-run gain Adjustment Cost
No Policy Education Subsidy Employment Subsidy Vocational Training
Output 8.96 22.06 22.22 20.66 22.53
Welfare 5.16 22.38 16.61 28.47 14.97
Table 11: Welfare Losses under Different Labor Market Policies: Manufacturing Workers, Low
Educ
No Policy Education Subsidy Employment Subsidy Vocational Training
All 14.2466 11.7778 6.5196 -4.3435
Age 15-29 2.3165 -2.1573 -10.2378 -14.5649
Age 30-44 5.8336 7.1338 4.0833 -2.6283
Age 45-65 9.9713 9.4911 3.7877 -3.5483
Table 12: Welfare Losses under Different Labor Market Policies: Manufacturing Workers, High
Educ
No Policy Education Subsidy Employment Subsidy Vocational Training
All 14.2466 11.7778 6.5196 -4.3435
Age 15-29 13.0154 8.9352 -8.1637 -10.3403
Age 30-44 11.3714 9.7574 7.4451 -4.6351
Age 45-65 21.8148 20.1205 18.6873 3.0167
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Table C.1: Reduced-form Model: choice parameters:
Manufacturing Services School Home
age -0.0140 0.1054 -1.2991 -0.2130
(0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0057) (0.0020)
age2 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0153 0.0029
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Kids = 1 0.0526 0.1956 0.0363 0.2952
(0.0131) (0.0098) (0.0198) (0.0096)
Kids = 2 -0.0824 0.2562 0.0146 0.4213
(0.0194) (0.0137) (0.0334) (0.0133)
Educ 0.1521 0.2374 0.6622 0.1245
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0040) (0.0011)
Male -0.5601 0.6713 -1.1285 -1.7900
(0.0120) (0.0099) (0.0147) (0.0093)
Constant 0.9211 -2.1720 16.5807 5.9907
(0.0593) (0.0477) (0.07904) (0.04292)
Table C.2: Reduced-form Model: wage parameters:
Variable Agriculture Manufacturing Services
age 0.0220 0.0512 0.0804
(0.0020 (0.0017) (0.0019)
age2 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0008
(0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Educ 0.0265 0.0695 0.1113
(0.0019 (0.0010) (0.0010)
Male 0.1410 0.3176 0.1663
(0.0112 (0.0056) (0.0125)




Table E.1: Long-run Welfare under Adaptive Expectations:
Long-run Gain (%) Adjustment Cost (% of Long-run Gain)
Output 9.10 27.17
Welfare 5.19 27.76
Table E.2: Welfare Losses under Adaptive Expectations: Manufacturing Workers:
All 18.6157
Low Educ High Educ
Age 15-29 6.8975 19.5197
Age 30-44 9.0066 18.4746
Age 45-65 14.1864 24.2922
Table E.3: Welfare Losses under Adaptive Expectations: All Individuals:
All -5.8432
Low Educ High Educ
Age 15-29 -7.9945 -2.4813
Age 30-44 -14.9265 -15.4935




Figure 1: Choice Proportions by Gender and Age
Figure 2: Age-Wage Profiles by Gender
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Figure 3: Mean Log Wages by Year, Sector and Gender
Figure 4: Average Number of Pre-School Children by Gender
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Figure 5: Proportion Who Have Never Worked, Ages 22-65
Figure 6: Reservation Wages
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Figure 10: Transitions: Proportion of Highest and Lowest Educated Workers by Sector
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Figure 11: Transitions: Labor Market Policies
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Figure 12: Skill Premium Transitions: With and Without Endogenous Human Capital
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Figure D.1: Transitions: With Aggregate Capital and Manufacturing Productivity Growth:
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Figure E.1: Transitions: Rational vs. Adaptive Expectations:
69
Trade Liberalization and the Skill Premium:






Empirical studies document rising wage inequality in a number of developing countries that
liberalized trade, contradicting the predictions of the static Heckscher-Ohlin model. This trend
has been attributed to trade-induced skill-biased technology from abroad. This paper devel-
ops a dynamic equilibrium model with endogenous physical and human capital accumulation,
and demonstrates that trade liberalization can lead to rising skill premia even in the absence
of technology spillovers. The time span of rising skill premia depends on the rate at which
human capital adjusts to the new policy environment. This result highlights the shortcomings
of reduced-form empirical work that correlates wage changes with changes in trade indicators
across different points in time. In the presence of technology spillovers, the skill premium rises
even more. However, the impact on factor demand depends on the type of technology; relative
demand for low-skill labor decreases with skill-biased technical change (SBTC), but increases
with total factor productivity growth. Using industry and labor force survey data from Sri
Lanka — a small open developing country — the empirical analysis finds evidence of SBTC
accompanying liberalization of the manufacturing sector. Skill premia have increased while
employment and wage bill shares for low-skill labor have decreased; this is true regardless of
how skill is defined. These results highlight the importance of labor market dynamics in deter-
mining the post-liberalization outcomes for wage inequality and human capital investment, and
their interaction with technology.
∗This research was conducted with restricted access data from the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka.




A surprising result from the empirical trade literature is that wage inequality increased in de-
veloping countries following trade liberalization.1 This contradicts the prediction of the static
Heckscher-Ohlin model; that wage inequality declines in low-skill abundant countries that liber-
alize trade. Rising wage inequality has been attributed to trade-induced skill-biased technology
spillovers from abroad, and some empirical studies find evidence supporting this hypothesis.2
This paper develops a dynamic, overlapping generations (OLG), general equilibrium model in
which physical and human capital accumulation is determined by the optimizing investment
decisions of households. The model demonstrates analytically that liberalization of the high-
skill intensive sector can lead to rising skill premia along the transition path even in the absence
of technology spillovers. The length of time in which the skill premium monotonically rises
depends on the rate at which human capital adjusts to the new policy environment. In general,
the impact of liberalization on the model’s state variables differ significantly over the short vs.
long run. These results have an important empirical implication; the perceived outcome of trade
policy could depend on the time frame chosen for analysis. This highlights the shortcomings of
empirical studies that correlate wage changes and changes in trade indicators across different
points in time.
The model further demonstrates that trade-induced technology spillovers have ambiguous
implications for differently skilled workers. While technology raises the skill premium, relative
skill demand depends on the type of technology involved. Relative demand for low-skill labor
decreases in the presence of skill-biased technical change (SBTC), but increases when technical
change raises total factor productivity (TFP). Therefore, the impact of trade-induced technical
change on the relative fortunes of low- versus high-skill labor is an empirical question that this
paper attempts to answer. The empirical analysis is conducted with detailed industry and labor
force survey data from Sri Lanka, a small open developing country that has experienced rising
wage inequality since embarking on a program of trade reforms in the late 1970s. Technology
is assumed to be embedded in imports of capital goods. The results show SBTC has been
the dominant form of technical change in Sri Lanka. Increases in skill premia have coincided
with declines in the employment and wage-bill shares of low-skilled labor. These results hold
1A large literature documents the relationship between wages and trade indicators in several countries. Some examples
are Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) for Colombia, and Robbins (1996), Wood (1997) and Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2007) for several Latin American and Asian countries.
2For example, Attanasio et al. (2004) conclude that skill-biased technical change (SBTC) may have been an indirect




regardless of how ‘skill’ is defined.
This paper is related to previous work on the impact of trade liberalization on skill acqui-
sition. Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) develop a two-good, two-factor trade model in which
education capital is an input to producing skilled labor. Using comparative statics, they show
that the country with higher per capita education capital will export the skill-intensive good
and increase its relative endowment of skilled labor following trade liberalization, thus am-
plifying its initial comparative advantage. This paper departs from their analysis in its use of
a dynamic framework that allows for non-monotonic transitions of the state variables to their
new steady state values. In Blanchard and Willmann (2013), ex-ante heterogeneous workers
optimally choose among a continuum of skill levels, each mapped to a different production
sector. In their comparative statics analysis, cross-country differences in education cost func-
tions drive comparative advantage. However, eduction is not a sunk cost in their model, thus
underestimating the welfare losses to workers who switch sectors.
In a related paper from the labor literature, Abraham (2008) develops a dynamic overlapping
generations model with costly education investment and exogenous skill-biased technological
progress. He uses numeric simulations to show that education investment and the wage skill
premium both evolve non-monotonically, matching the non-cyclical evolution of college enroll-
ment and the college wage premium in the US. This paper is similar to his in that sunk education
costs and the finite individual time horizon interact to produce non-monotonic transitions be-
tween steady states. However, this paper differs from his in that it develops a tractable model
that can be solved analytically while producing equally rich dynamics within an international
trade setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a dynamic overlapping generations
model in which individual choices in consumption and investment in physical and human capital
determine production, trade flows, wages, and thus, the economy’s response to a trade policy
change. Section 3 demonstrates analytically the impact of trade liberalization on the economy in
the short, medium and long run. The differences in transition dynamics with and without trade-
induced technology spillovers are highlighted. Section 4 conducts a numeric calibration of the
model and visually demonstrates the transitional dynamics from Section 3. Section 5 conducts
an empirical analysis to test whether rising wage inequality in Sri Lanka is due to trade-induced




This section develops a dynamic overlapping generations version of the two-good, three-factor,
specific factors model of Ricardo-Viner-Samuelson-Jones.3 The combination of specific-factors
with overlapping generations allows the model to capture the short, medium and long-run ef-
fects of trade liberalization. Individuals live for two periods and maximize lifetime utility by
choosing their consumption, saving and skill levels while young. Individual decisions collec-
tively determine the economy’s production levels, physical and human capital stocks, trade
flows, and wages.
2.1 Production
The economy produces two goods: X is both a consumption good and an investment good, and







where Kx and Ky are physical capital, H is high-skill labor, L is low-skill labor, and Ax and
Ay are total factor productivity in each sector. High-skill labor is specific to the consumption-
investment goods sector, while low-skill labor is specific to the consumption goods sector.
Physical capital is perfectly mobile between sectors. The specific-factors assumption facili-
tates analytical results. However, individuals in each generation choose whether to become
skilled or not, and thus, which sector to join. Labor supply is therefore mobile between sectors
even though skills are not.
2.2 Factor prices
Factor markets are perfectly competitive, which means factors payments equal their marginal









3Viner (1931) first examined the specific factors model, and it was later formalized into a general equilibrium setting
by Samuelson (1971) and Jones (1971).
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where Px and Py are output prices for goods X and Y . Because of perfect inter-sectoral capital








Output prices are defined as Px = P
w
x (1 + τx) and Py = P
w
y (1 + τy), where P
w
x and
Pwy are the domestic prices for each good, and τx and τy are the ad-valorem import tariff rates
imposed on each good. The domestic prices, Pwx and P
w
y , are assumed to be the same as world
prices and are taken as given (small open economy assumption).
2.3 Household decisions
Households consist of individuals who live for two periods. They provide labor services when
young and consume out of their savings when old. Every young individual makes two choices
to maximize his present discounted lifetime utility; whether to invest in education and how
much of each good to consume.
If he chooses to invest in education, he works in sector X , and if not, in sector Y . Individuals
are ex-ante heterogeneous in ability, γ, which determines their education costs. The distribution
of ability, F (γ), is exogenous and identical across generations, and each individual knows his
draw of γ. For individual i who is young at time t, the decision to become skilled maximizes
wages net of education costs:
wit = max
{




Education costs are in terms of the consumption good, Y. The cost function is:
e(γ) = κ0 + κ1γ
where κ0 > 0 and κ1 < 0 are parameters.
The young individual must also choose his consumption level to maximize his present dis-
counted lifetime utility:
U = U1t + βU
2
t+1 (4)
The superscripts 1 and 2 stand for ‘young’ and ‘old’, respectively, and β is the time discount
rate. Flow utility at any age is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of goods X





























The parameter φ is the weight given by consumers to good Y relative to good X , and ρ
captures the degree of substitutablity of the two goods.4 For simplicity, it is assumed that the
two goods have equal weight (φ = 1).
The aggregate net income of all young individuals living at time t is:
W 1t = r
LL+ rHH − PytE (7)
where rLL is total labor income to young low-skill individuals, rHH is total labor income to
young high-skill individuals, and PytE is total education costs. The aggregate net income of
old individuals living at time t is:








where Kt is the aggregate capital stock,
rKt
Pxt
is the real rental rate, and δ is the depreciation rate
for capital.
The maximization problem yields the following aggregate consumption demand functions









































where σ = 11−ρ . Aggregate saving by young individuals is:
4The goods are perfectly substitutable if ρ = 1, not substitutable if ρ = − inf , and have constant elasticity of










At any time t, old individuals derive income by selling all of their capital stock holdings, net
of depreciation, to young individuals. The savings of young individuals at time t are used to
purchase the capital holdings of the old generation, (1− δ)Kt, and pay for any new investment,
XIt . With no international borrowing and saving, domestic saving equals domestic physical
capital investment:
St = Pxt · (1− δ)Kt + PxtX
I
t
The capital stock that enters period t + 1 is therefore the stock of all capital investment
purchases made by the young generation alive at time t. Because saving equals investment, this
must equal real saving at time t:






Aggregate demand for good X is the sum of young and old consumption demand, C1xt
and C2xt, and investment demand X
I
t . Aggregate supply of good X is the sum of domestic
production, Xt, and net imports, X
m
t . The market for good X clears by the equalization of





t = Xt +X
m
t (15)
Aggregate demand for good Y is the sum of young and old consumption demand, C1yt and
C2yt, and total education costs, Et. Market clearing for good Y is:
C1yt + C
2
yt + Et = Yt + Y
m
t (16)
where Y mt is net imports of good Y . With no international borrowing and saving, the trade









Each individual’s ability, γ, is drawn from a uniform distribution, F (γ), with minimum and
maximum values of γ and γ, respectively. Denote as γ∗ the threshold level of ability that makes
an individual indifferent between becoming educated versus not. The stock of high-skill human











where µ1, µ2 and µ3 are positive parameters. This equation shows that Ht is a decreasing
function of γ∗ (the threshold ability level) and an increasing function of Ht−1, the previous
time period’s stock of high-skill human capital. This specification allows the impact of previous
generations’ choices to persist over time. (If µ2 = 0, then Ht only depends on the current
generation’s education choices.)
If individuals lived — and worked — for many periods, then older generations will also
supply labor services. Because of the finite-horizon lifetime, older generations may find it too
costly to adjust their level of education in response to any change in market conditions. This is
because the benefits of such an adjustment can only be reaped over their short remaining work-
ing life. Moreover, since education costs are sunk, education adjustment can only occur in one
direction; high-skill individuals cannot go back to becoming low-skilled and recover their prior
education costs. Thus, with 40- or 50-year working lives, the early choices of older generations
persist over time, preventing aggregate skill stocks from adjusting instantaneously in response
to an economic shock.5 The economy will therefore respond slowly to a tariff reduction or
other exogenous change in market conditions. Equation 18 allows for this persistence within
an analytically solvable two-period setting. As will be demonstrated below, the adjustment of
human capital has key implications for the evolution of the skill premium.





5The structural empirical trade literature estimates that the economy takes between 25 and 80 years to fully adjust to
a single trade policy change. This is because older generations find it too costly to adjust their stocks of human capital in




3 Trade Policy and the Skill Premium
This section demonstrates analytically the impact of a trade policy change on the economy.
The analysis focuses on the impact of a tariff reduction on the skill premium and relative factor
employment during the economy’s transition to its new steady state. Moreover, the implications
for the short, medium, and long run — and their bearing on the results of empirical studies —
are discussed. Time subscripts are omitted for clarity.
Since tariffs appear directly in output prices, the impact of a change in tariff policy can
be evaluated by changing output prices. Using the zero-profit conditions for each sector, tak-
ing logs and totally differentiating, the relationship between changes in the skill premium and
changes in output prices is derived as:

























> 0 and the hat symbol (̂) denotes the percentage change in the
given variable (see Appendix A.1 for the derivation).
Since developing countries provide the motivation for this paper, assume that P̂x− P̂y < 0;
the tariff imposed on the high-skill sector, X , experiences a relative decline. To evaluate the
‘short-term’ impact on the skill premium, it is assumed that production factors have not yet had
time to adjust. This means Ĥ = L̂ = K̂ = 0. The change in the skill premiun is:
(r̂H − r̂L) = 1
c
(P̂x − P̂y)
Thus, in the absence of any factor supply response, the skill premium falls when the devel-
oping country liberalizes trade. This conforms to the result for the classical ‘immobile factors’,
or short-run, trade model in which production factors are fixed in terms of quantity and sec-
tor. In subsequent time periods, however, individuals will respond to the decline in the skill
premium by reducing their investment in education. This means Ĥ < 0. If X is the capital
intensive sector, then (1 − αx) > (1 − αy) ⇒ αx < αy . It follows from the equilibrium





. Thus, equation 20 shows that the decline in H
partially reverses the initial decline in the skill premium if X is the capital-intensive sector:
(r̂H − r̂L) = 1
c
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from the cost minimization conditions. This means that regardless of the relative
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capital-labor intensities of the two sectors, when the high-skill sector experiences a tariff cut,
the skill premium rises following its short-run decline.
This medium-run effect on the skill premium depends on the persistence of H across time.
The larger the persistence of prior generations’ human capital (µ2), the smaller the decrease
in H in response to the short-run fall in the skill premium. This is because the current young
generation’s education choices only partially affect the existing level of human capital. Because
of this slow adjustment in human capital stocks, the monotonic rise in the skill premium occurs
over a longer time span, thus taking longer to reach its new steady-state value.
Note that the new steady-state skill premium is lower than the old one. Thus, the model’s
long-run implications conform to the Heckscher-Ohlin — or long run — trade model in which
all production factors reallocate instantly in response to the trade policy change. However,
the Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes fixed quantities of production factors. The transitional
dynamics in this model are the result of production factors responding endogenously to the
trade policy change.
These transitional dynamics have important implications for empirical research on the labor-
market impact of trade liberalization. With individual working lives spanning 40-50 years in
most countries, the education decisions of multiple generations determine human capital stocks
at any given time t. This means the aggregate human capital stock takes several years to adjust
to the new policy environment, implying that a monotonic rise in the skill premium may occur
over several years. The rising skill premia documented in developing countries could thus
be attributed to the endogenous response of human capital to the liberalization of previously
protected high-skill sectors. The main result here is that the skill premium’s transition is not
monotonic as predicted by classical trade models.
The evolution of the physical capital stock also has implications for the skill premium. The
relative decline in the output price of the consumption-investment good, X , raises investment
demand relative to consumption demand. Thus, the aggregate capital stock increases along the
transition path to a new, higher steady state level; that is, K̂ > 0. If X is the capital intensive
sector such that αx < αy , then the skill premium increases as the capital stock grows:
(r̂H − r̂L) = 1
c
{














This means that the skill premium will initially decline, then rise monotonically to its new
steady state value. However, if X is the labor intensive sector such that αx > αy , then the
skill premium decreases as the capital stock grows. This is because the new additions to the
capital stock are absorbed disproportionately by Y , the capital-intensive sector. Since Y is the
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low-skill sector, low-skill wages will rise relative to high-skill wages. This means that the skill
premium will decline initially, rise in the medium run, and then decline monotically to its new
steady-state value. Since trade reforms in developing countries typically target capital-intensive
manufacturing industries, the former trend is more likely to occur.
Because the tariff reduction targets the high-skill sector, the economy-wide demand for
high-skill relative to low-skill labor decreases to a lower steady-state level. However, as with the
skill premium, the transitional dynamics are not monotonic; H
L
falls in the short run following
the trade policy change, but partially recovers along the transition path due to the rise in the
skill premium.
The model’s post-liberalization dynamics can be summarized as follows:
1. Trade liberalization that targets the high-skill sector will reduce the skill premium in the
long run. However, the skill premium’s evolution over the transition path will be non-
monotonic.
2. The longer it takes for human capital to adjust to the new policy, the longer the relative
time span during which the skill premium rises monotonically.
3. If the targeted sector is capital (labor) intensive, the skill premium increases (decreases)
as the capital stock grows. Thus, the evolution of the skill premium depends not only on
whether the targeted sector is high-skill versus low-skill intensive, but also on whether it
is capital versus labor intensive.
4. The relative employment of low-kill versus high-skill labor increases in the long run, but
has non-monotonic transtional dynamics.
3.1 The Role of Technology Spillovers
The main hypothesis in the literature for explaining rising skill premia is that trade liberaliza-
tion has been accompanied by technology spillovers from abroad. Manufacturing industries
being the main targets of liberalization, imports of manufactured goods from developed coun-
tries increased, bringing with them superior production technologies and knowledge that were
previously unavailable to developing countries. If these new production processes complement
high-skill labor and/or substitute low-skill labor, then the technology is said to be skill-biased,
raising relative wages and employment for workers with better education and training. The
net effect on inequality depends on the extent of the technology spillover (relative to the tariff
reductions). Thus, trade liberalization could benefit the scarce factor in developing countries if
accompanied by technology spillovers from abroad.
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To evaluate this hypothesis, this section investigates the impact of technology on the skill
premium and relative factor demand. Two distinct forms of technology are considered here;
skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Both types
of technology are assumed to accompany liberalization of the consumption-investment good,
X . As demonstrated below, SBTC and TFP growth have similar implications for the skill
premium, but very different implications for the relative employment of high-skill versus low-
skill workers.
Skill-Biased Technical Change
If a skill-biased technical change (SBTC) occurs in sector X , then at given relative factor prices,
the demand for high-skill labor increases relative to capital. The simplest way to impose SBTC
in the model is to assume α̂x > 0. The relationship between changes in output prices and
changes in the skill premium changes is now given by:












































> 0. Therefore, α̂x > 0 raises the skill premium.
Whether the new steady-state skill premium is higher or lower than the old depends on the
magnitude of SBTC relative to the tariff cut; if SBTC is very large, then the new steady-state
skill premium will be higher than before, permanently increasing economy-wide wage inequal-
ity.
To evaluate the impact on factor demand, note that SBTC lowers production costs. Specif-
ically, at given factor prices, SBTC allows producers to reduce the quantity of inputs while
holding production levels fixed. To determine the relative change in labor and capital employed







Taking logs and totally differentiating, and keeping factor prices fixed at their initial levels
(i.e. r̂H = r̂K = 0):
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K̂x = Ĥ −
α̂x
(1−αx)
Since α̂x > 0 by assumption, then K̂x < Ĥ . Because producers reduce inputs at fixed
factor prices, K̂x and Ĥ are both negative. Thus, K̂x < Ĥ means that producers reduce Kx by
more than they reduce H . SBTC therefore raises the ratio of H with respect to other production
inputs within the liberalized sector. The empirical implication is that SBTC raises employment
of high-skill labor relative to other inputs in the liberalized sectors. Whether the economy-wide
demand for high-skill versus low-skill labor rises depends on the magnitude of SBTC relative
to the tariff cut; if SBTC is large, the economy-wide H
L
ratio will increase, even though the
tariff cut targeted the high-skill sector.
Total Factor Productivity Growth
TFP growth in sector X is modeled as an increase in Ax relative to Ay . The relationship
between changes in output prices and the skill premium is now:
(r̂H − r̂L) = 1
c
{














+ (Âx − Ây)
}
The equation shows that (Âx − Ây) > 0 implies a rise in the skill premium. Moreover, if
TFP growth is large relative to the tariff cut, the new steady-state skill premium will be higher
than the old.
To evaluate what this implies for relative factor employment in sector X , use factor price





















)− Ĥ(αx + αy
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) = (P̂x − P̂y) + (Âx − Ây)
TFP growth in sector X raises factor returns in sector X relative to sector Y . Therefore,
labor and capital start moving into sector X . This means a larger percentage of each young










, then X is the capital
intensive sector. Thus, because the marginal return to capital is already low, the flow of labor











, then X is the labor intensive sector. This means TFP growth will bring a greater
flow of capital than labor into sector X; that is, K̂x > Ĥ > 0.
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The empirical implication of these results can be summarized as follows: TFP growth in
a particular sector lowers the relative employment of the factor used most intensively in that
sector. Thus, TFP growth in a high-skill intensive sector will lower the relative employment of
high-skill labor. Note that this is in contrast to the empirical implication for SBTC which is that
the relative employment of high-skill labor rises in the affected sector. Hence, while both types
of technology spillovers have the same implications for the skill premium, they have different
implications for differently skilled workers. Whether trade-induced technology spillovers come
in the form of SBTC or TFP growth is therefore an empirical question that is tested in Section
5 of this paper using data from Sri Lanka.
4 Simulation
In this section, the model is simulated to demonstrate graphically the analytical results from
Section 3. The model parameters used are listed in Table 1. Note that the consumption-
investment good sector, X , is relatively more capital intensive than the consumption good sec-
tor, Y ; i.e. αx < αy . Using initial guesses for the state variables, the model is simulated until
the pre-liberalization steady state reached. Then, the tariff imposed on good X is reduced from
0.01 to 0 and the model is simulated until the economy reaches its new steady-state.
Figure 1 shows the economy’s transition between the pre- and post-liberalization steady
states when there is no persistence in human capital (µ2 = 0). All initial steady-state values
have been normalized to 1. As predicted by the analytical results, the skill premium declines
sharply at first (the short-run effect) and then rises monotonically to its new, lower steady-state
level. Thus, the time frame in which the skill premium is observed to rise far exceeds that in
which the skill premium is observed to fall. Similarly, the quantity of high-skill workers drops
sharply at first, but then rises monotonically to a new, lower steady-state level. The quantity
of low-skill labor shows the opposite trend, rising sharply then declining gradually to a higher
steady-state level.
Both labor and capital reallocate to sector Y . Because the consumption-investment good
becamse cheaper, both consumption and investment demand for good X increases. Net imports
of X increase to satisfy part of this greater demand. Because of the influx of capital goods, the
rental rate declines over time. Meanwhile, because good Y became relatively more expensive,
demand for Y decreases, lowering net imports. The low-skill wage rises steadily to a higher
steady-state level. However, the high-skill wage shows a non-monotonic transition. It first
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declines sharply as a result of the tariff reduction in the high-skill sector. This decline is then
partially reversed following the sharp initial drop in education investment.
Figure 2 shows the transition when human capital persists over time (µ2 = 0). The most
important difference is that the transition period is now longer; the economy requires more time
periods to reach its new steady state. This means the skill premium rises over a longer time span
when human capital is persistent. (This also means the skill premium rises more gradually.) In
an economy with 40- or 50-year working lives, human capital is very persistent; i.e. human
capital stocks take several generations to adjust to a trade policy change. Thus, depending on
the time horizon of the data used, an empirical analysis of a developing country’s skill premium
over time may lead to the erroneous conclusion that trade liberalization causes greater wage
inequality.
Figures 3 and 4 show the transitions with skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and TFP
growth, respectively, in sector X . In both cases, the skill premium rises monotonically through-
out the transition; the short-term decline from the previous figures do not appear here.6
Figures 5 and 6 show the transitions for the ratio between high-skill labor and other pro-
duction factors (i.e. capital) in sector X . As predicted in the analytical results, SBTC increases
the ratio of skilled labor relative to the other production factor in the high-skill intensive sector,
while TFP growth decreases this ratio. Thus, the impact of trade-induced technology spillovers
depends on the type of technology involved. In reality, every sector uses a mix of high-skill and
low-skill labor along with capital and other inputs. The empirical implication, therefore, is that
the relative demand for a developing country’s abundant factor — low-skill labor — will de-
cline with trade-induced SBTC but will increase with trade-induced TFP growth. The opposite
is true for the scarce factor — high-skill labor. These results suggest that the direction of change
in the skill premium does not predict the direction of change in relative employment of differ-
ently skilled workers. These implications of trade-induced technology is tested empirically in
the next section using data from Sri Lanka.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka embarked on a program of structural reform in the late 1970s following several
decades of inward-looking policies. Tariff reductions were among several policies implemented
6These simulations do not have persistent human capital. If human capital were persistent, the qualitative results do
not change; the only difference is that the transition to the new steady state takes longer.
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among which were the privatization of several industries and the liberalizing of foreign invest-
ment. However, even through the early 1990s, manufacturing tariffs remained high. Once Sri
Lanka joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, significant tariff cuts took place
subsequent two decades as a result of the reciprocal nature of WTO agreements. Figure 7 plots
the simple average applied tariff rates for goods entering the country for different manufacutring
industries for the 1990-2004 period. The tariff data is obtained from the database constructed
in Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).7 The plots show that tariffs declined for all 28 manufacturing
industries by an average of 50% across the fourteen years.
To see what happened to relative wages and employment during this time period, data from
the Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey (LFS) is used. The LFS covers approximately 5,000 na-
tionally representative households every quarter and is conducted by the Department of Census
and Statistics, a government agency in Sri Lanka. The data spans the 1992-2009 time period
and contains individual-level information on wages, education, four-digit ISIC industry, and
four-digit ISCO occupation along with many other variables.8 Table 2 shows relative wages
and employment shares in the manufacturing sector for 1992, 2000, and 2009 for workers clas-
sified by education level and occupation type (white- versus blue-collar).9 As a comparison,
the corresponding trends for the services (non-tradeables) sector is shown in the same table.
The skill premium in the manufacturing sector has increased during this time period, regard-
less of whether skill is defined by education level or occupation type. In contrast, the services
sector has experienced a decline in the skill premium. Thus, these skill premium changes in
manufacturing are not indicative of a general, economy-wide trend.
The employment and wage bill shares of white-collar, educated workers — the most skilled
labor — have both increased substantially during this time period. These increases have been
more dramatic in manufacturing than in services. In constrast, blue-collar, less educated work-
ers — the least skilled labor — experienced a large decline employment and wage bill shares in
both sectors. These changes were much smaller for the two remaining groups — white-collar,
less educated workers and blue-collar, educated workers. Note that the shares of both manu-
facturing and services in real GDP increased during this time period, from 14% to 18%, and
7Industries are classified at the 3-digit level according to Revision 2 of the International Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation (ISIC). The data is available only for the 1990-2004 time period.
8ISCO stands for International Standard Classification of Occupations.
9White collar occupations are those numbering 1 through 5 under ISCO Revision 3, while blue collar occupations
number 6 through 9. Workers classified as ‘high-educ’ are those who have completed and passed the Ordinary Level ex-
amination in high school. ‘Low-educ’ workers are all those who have an education level below the O’Level qualification.
The O’Level is administered by the central government for studends aged 16. Passing grades are required for entering
the Advanced (or collegiate) level and is also a requirement for admission to US colleges.
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from 62.5% to 69.2%, respectively. Therefore, rather than contracting after the loss of tariff
protection, the manufacturing sector increased in importance in Sri Lankan GDP.
Thus, a period of large-scale tariff cuts in the manufacturing sector coincided with a rising
skill premium and rising employment and wage-bill shares for high-skill workers. This contra-
dicts the classical trade models which predict that the relative wages and employment shares of
low-skill labor will increase following trade liberalization in developing countries.
These trends in the manufacturing sector provide preliminary evidence of trade-induced
SBTC. However, a more rigorous analysis is required to establish a relationship between trade
and technology. This is discussed in the next subsection.
5.2 Empirical Specifications
As discussed in Section 3, the source of trade-induced technology spillovers is assumed to be
imported capital goods. Therefore, the empirical analysis will use the share of imported capital
goods in total production inputs as the variable that represents technology from abroad. The
idea is that the larger the proportion of imported capital goods in total inputs, the larger the
quantity of new, productivity-enhancing technology that benefits that particular sector.
To capture the impact of TFP growth, the following production function is assumed:











where Yj is real value added in sector j, Aj is total factor productivity, Hj and Lj are high- and
low-skill labor, respectively, Kj is capital, Ij is total intermediate inputs, and IMj is the share
of imported capital goods in total intermediate inputs. Taking logs and adding time subscripts
yields the regression equation:
logYjt = α0 + α1IMjt + α2logHjt + α3logLjt + α4logKjt + α5logIjt + ǫjt (23)
Equation 23 is estimated with industry and time fixed effects. A positive and statistically
significant coefficient on IMjt implies that capital imports carry productivity-enhancing tech-
nology; that is, the larger the share of capital imports in total intermediate goods, the larger is
total factor productivity.
On the other hand, if capital imports bring about skill-biased technical change, then the skill
premium and the employment and wage bill shares of high-skill workers in sector j should be
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positively correlated with the share of capital imports in total intermediate goods in sector j.
The regression specification is thus:
logZjt = α0 + α1IMjt + α2logXjt + ǫjt (24)
The term Zjt is one of three different dependent variables; the skill premium, the ratio
between high-skill and low-skill employment, and the low-skill wage bill share in industry j
at time t. The vector X contains a number of industry-specific control variables that could
also have an impact on Z; the shares of exports and imports in value added, the investment to
value added ratio, and the capital to value added ratio. Equation 24 is estimated with industry
and time fixed effects. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on IMjt for all three
dependent variables suggests the presence of trade-induced SBTC.
5.3 Data
The main data source for the analysis is the publicly available Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI), a survey of all firms in Sri Lanka conducted by Department of Census and Statistics
(DCS). The ASI gives detailed information on output, value added, employment and wages by
skill level and occupation type, raw and intermediate input use, capital stock, and new invest-
ment for all manufacturing industries at the four-digit ISIC level.10 This data is available on the
DCS website for the years 2005-2009.
Data on imported intermediate inputs used in each manufacturing industry is not available
for Sri Lanka. However, this can data can be constructed as in Feenstra and Hanson (1996)
using input-output tables constructed for Sri Lanka by Amarasinghe and Bandara (2005) along
with data on imports from UNComtrade. The share of capital imports in total intermediate
goods is computed as:
IMjt = Sjt × Ijt
where Sjt is the share of capital inputs in total inputs in industry j at time t, and Ijt is the ratio
of capital imports to total domestic demand for capital goods. The IO tables in Amarasinghe
and Bandara (2005) are constructed for the year 2000 only. Therefore, it is assumed that Sjt =
Sj,2000 for all industries j; that is, the share of capital inputs in total inputs in industry j is
constant over time.
10The industries surveyed in the ASI are categorized according to the International Standard Industry Classification
(ISIC) Revision 3. The industry codes covered in the ASI range from ISIC 1410 through 4100, which includes all
manufacturing industries, utilities and some mining industries.
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Capital goods are defined as the subset of manufactured goods that includes equipment,
machinery, vehicles, and furniture. These are classified under ISIC two-digit codes 29 through
36. Table 3 lists the capital goods used in the analysis. Non-capital goods comprise chiefly of
consumer products such as food, clothing and paper, as well as non-capital intermediate goods
such as steel and fertilizer. Table 4 compares skill premia, relative employment and wage bill
shares for capital and non-capital goods. As assumed in the model in Section 3, capital goods
industries are more skill intensive and have larger skill premia. Thus, capital goods can be
thought of as the high-skill sectors.
Three different categorizations of high-skill versus low-skill are tested for the regression
analysis. The first two categorizations define skill by educational attainment and occupation
type; these are the same categorizations used in Subsection 5.1. The quantity of labor in each
skill category is constructed for every industry using individual data in the LFS. The third cate-
gorization is obtained directly from the the ASI. The ASI classifies workers in each industry as
‘skilled operatives’, ‘unskilled operatives’, ‘administrative’, ‘technical’, ‘clerical’, and ‘other’.
For the regressions, ‘skilled operatives’ are considered high-skill labor and ‘unskilled opera-
tives’ are considered low-skill labor. The ASI gives the total number employed, the total wage
bill, and the average wage per person for each type of worker. This information is used to
construct the labor-market variables for equations 23 and 24.
5.4 Results
Table 5 shows the results for equation 23, which is tested for the three different categorizations
of skill. The coefficient on the share of capital goods imports in total inputs (IMjt) is positive
and significant regardless of how skill is categorized. The results suggest that imports of capital
goods have a positive impact on total factor productivity; that is, holding all production factors
constant (labor, physical capital, and intermediate inputs), an increase in the share of imported
capital goods in total inputs corresponds to higher output. These results provide evidence of
trade-induced productivity enhancements through imported capital goods.
Table 6 gives the results for equation 24. When skill is measured as white- versus blue-
collar, capital goods imports have a positive and significant impact on the skill premium. (The
impact is positive but not significant when skill is measured by educational attainment.) Capital
goods imports have a negative effect on the low-to-high skill employment ratio, and this effect
is significant when skill is measured by educational attainment. Capital imports also have a
negative impact on the wage bill share of low-skill workers, and this effect is significant when
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skill is measured by educational attainment. Although the results are not significant for all
categorizations of skill, the evidence points to the presence of trade-induced SBTC; relative
wages, employment ratios, and wage bill shares of high-skill workers are all positively impacted
by capital goods imports.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results for an additional test; the impact of capital imports on labor
productivity, which is defined as industry value added divided by total industry employment.
Table 6 gives the results for a panel regression while Table 7 shows the results for a first-
difference regression. Both regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The model is
tested for total industry employment calculated from both the LFS and ASI data. The results
show that the impact of capital imports on labor productivity is positive and significant for all
regressions.
Overall, these results suggest that imports of high-skill intensive capital goods entering Sri
Lanka contain technologies that raise domestic productivity. The model developed in Section
3 predicted that trade liberalization accompanied by technology spillovers will raise the skill
premium, and that the relative employment of high-skill labor with rise with SBTC but fall
with TFP growth. The evidence from Sri Lanka points to SBTC being the dominant form of
technology spillover. Thus, although total factor productivity and total labor productivity are
positively impacted by an increase in trade flows, high-skill workers are relatively bettter off
than low-skill workers in terms of both wages and employment.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a tractable dynamic overlapping generations model of an economy to un-
derstand the impact of trade liberalization on the skill premium and human capital investment
in a developing country. Analytical results show that liberalization of the high-skill sector can
lead to rising skill premia even in the absence of any skill-biased technical change. Even though
the new steady-state skill premium is below the old, as predicted by classical trade models, the
transitional dynamics are non-monotonic. Moreover, the greater the persistence of prior gen-
erations’ human capital over time, the longer the transition to the new steady state, and thus,
the greater the time frame in which the skill premium monotonically rises. This suggests that
in a typical economy with 40 or 50 generations in the workforce at any given time, the skill




These results have importance implications for empirical work. Reduced-form studies that
correlate trade policy changes with wage changes across different points in time fail to cap-
ture these crucial transitional dynamics and may erroneously conclude that trade liberalization
causes rising wage inequality in low-skill abundant countries. The results in this paper point to
the importance of considering labor market dynamics in evaluating the impact of trade policy
changes on labor markets.
When trade liberalization accompanies technology spillovers, the skill premium rises through-
out the entire transition (i.e. the transition is no longer monotonic). However, the impact on rel-
ative factor demand depends on the type of technology involved. If technology spillovers come
in the form of total factor productivity growth (TFP), the employment share of high-skill labor
declines. On the other hand, skill-biased technical change (SBTC) increases the employment
share of high-skill workers. Therefore, the empirical implication is that the relative demand for
a developing country’s abundant factor — low-skill labor — will decreases if trade liberaliza-
tion is accompanied with SBTC but will increase with TFP growth. This means the direction
of change in the skill premium cannot predict the change in relative factor employment when
technology spillovers accompany tariff reductions. Therefore, the impact of trade-induced tech-
nology on the labor market is an empirical question that is tested in this paper using data from
Sri Lanka.
The empirical analysis assumes that imports of capital goods are the main source of trade-
induced technological change. This is because capital goods — which includes equipment
and machinery — involve relatively sophisticated production techniques in which developed
countries have a comparative advantage. Capital goods are also more high-skill intensive than
consumption goods; skill premia and employment and wage bill shares of high-skill workers
are larger in capital goods than in consumption goods industries. For the regression analysis,
the share of imported capital goods in total production inputs is the variable used to capture the
impact of trade-induced technology spillovers across industries.
Results from different regression specifications all point to trade-induced technology spillovers
in Sri Lanka. Moreover, capital imports have had a positive impact on the skill premium as
well as on the employment and wage bill shares of high-skill workers. These results hold for
three different categorizations of skill. Since high-skill workers have thus enjoyed a rise in
both relative wages and relative demand, the evidence points to SBTC as the dominant form of
technology spillover. Overall, the results in this paper point to the importance of considering
labor market dynamics in evaluating the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality and
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For any variable z, define its percentage change as ẑ = dz
z
. Then, the above expression
becomes:
P̂x = αx(Ĥ + r̂
H) + (1− αx)(K̂x + r̂
K)− Âx − αxĤ − (1− αx)K̂x
which simplifies to:
P̂x = αxr̂
H + (1− αx)r̂
KKx
Similarly, for good Y :
P̂y = αy r̂
L + (1− αy)r̂
KKy
The relationship between the change in relative output prices and the change in the skill
premium is:
P̂x − P̂y = (αxr̂
H
− αy r̂
L)− (αx − αy)r̂
K
Assuming no underutilization of capital, we get the following expression:





Taking logs and totally differentiating yields the following expression for r̂K :






Substituting this into the expression for the relative output price change and rearranging
yields:






















With SBTC, we now assume α̂x > 0. Using the zero-profit conditions, the relationship between
the change in relative output prices and the change in the skill premium becomes:
(P̂x − P̂y) = (αxr̂
H
− αy r̂





With the assumption of full capital utilization, the expression for r̂K becomes:












































To show how SBTC affects the skill premium, we need to show that log( H
Kx
) > 0. Write
the production function for sector X , take logs and totally differentiate, assuming α̂x > 0:




With SBTC, producers can now reduce the quantity of inputs while keeping X fixed. There-







) = α̂x − Ĥ







Figure 1: Trends in Manufacturing Tariffs
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Figure 2: Transitions: Without Persistent H
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Figure 3: Transitions: With Persistent H
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Figure 4: Transitions: With Skill-Biased Technical Change
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Figure 5: Transitions: With TFP Growth
Figure 6: Skilled Labor-Capital Ratio with TFP Growth
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Table 1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Name Symbol Value
Consumpton goods substitutability ρ 0.9
Minimum ability γ 0.01
Maximum ability γ̄ 1
Education fixed cost κ0 1
Education variable cost κ1 1
Sector X labor income share αx 0.5
Sector Y labor income share αy 0.6
Sector X initial tariff τx 0.01
Sector Y initial tariff τy 0
Time discount factor β 0.9
Physical capital depreciation rate δ 0.5
Human capital evolution parameters µ1 2
µ2 0.2
µ3 0.2
Table 2: Capital goods industries
ISIC code Description
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.y
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
Table 3: Wages and employment in capital vs. non-capital manufacturing industries
Skill premium Employment ratio Wage bill share
White-blue High-low educ Blue-white Low-high educ Blue Low educ
Capital 2.364 1.946 4.050 1.271 0.576 0.334
Non-capital 2.272 1.787 6.108 2.470 0.594 0.456
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Table 4: Sector trends
Manufacturing Services
1992 2000 2009 % ∆ 1992 2000 2009 % ∆
Ratio of mean wages
White-blue collar 1.92 2.09 2.32 21% 1.71 1.69 1.52 -11%
High-low educ 1.52 1.59 1.86 22% 1.78 1.74 1.65 -7%
Employment share (%)
White-collar 10.61 13.13 19.72 86% 51.93 55.70 55.99 7%
White-collar, high-educ 7.20 8.31 13.10 82% 31.42 34.86 37.08 18%
White-collar, low-educ 3.41 4.82 6.63 94% 20.51 20.84 18.91 -8%
Blue-collar, high-educ 18.59 20.42 19.63 5% 7.43 7.52 8.47 14%
Blue-collar, low-educ 70.51 66.39 60.65 -14% 40.20 36.71 35.52 -11%
Wage bill share (%)
White-collar 20.67 24.94 45.37 119% 62.20 65.40 81.05 30%
White-collar, high-educ 16.37 20.59 40.33 146% 51.46 55.63 72.39 41%
White-collar, low-educ 4.30 4.35 5.04 17% 10.73 9.87 8.66 -19%
Blue-collar, high-educ 19.18 17.73 17.76 -7% 7.31 6.28 6.93 -5%
Blue-collar, low-educ 59.96 57.32 36.87 -38% 30.19 28.27 12.02 -60%
Table 5: Impact of capital goods imports on total factor productivity
Capital goods imports 3.66* 3.45* 3.90*
(2.02) (1.95) (1.99)
More educated labor -0.17** 0.1570
(0.08) (0.4432)
Less educated labor 0.16 ***
(0.06)
White collar labor -0.19***
(0.06)






Capital stock 0.07* 0.07* 0.09*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Total inputs 0.84**** 0.84**** 0.80****
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
R sq. 0.95 0.95 0.95
Adj. R sq. 0.64 0.64 0.66
The dependent variable is the log of real value added. The regression equation is tested for three different categoriza-
tions of skill; more educated vs. less educated, white collar v.s blue collar, and skill operatives vs. unskilled operatives.


















Table 6: Impact of capital goods imports on skill premium, employment ratios and wage bill shares
Skill premia Employment ratios Wage bill shares
White-blue collar High-low educ Blue-white collar Low-high educ Blue collar Low educ
Capital goods imports 2.28** 0.85 -4.57 -2.87** -0.03 -0.31**
(1.07) (0.61) (5.73) ( 1.17) (0.15) (0.14)
Exports 7.78e-05 -8.00e-5 0.01 -1.77e-3 4.94e-4 1.28e-4
(0.01) (4.88e-3) (0.05) (1.06e-2) (1.28e-3) (1.18e-3)
Imports -1.50e-3 8.42e-4 -0.01 2.13e-3 -2.25e-4 -4.29e-4
(3.04e-3) (1.90e-3) (0.02) (4.14e-3) (4.97e-4) (4.60e-4)
Investment 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.54 0.39** 5.56e-3 0.01
(0.12) (0.08) (0.79) ( 0.16) (0.02) (0.02)
Capital stock -3.52e-4** -1.30e-4 3.16e-4 1.33e-4 1.48e-5 2.93e-5
(1.70e-4) (1.04e-4) (1.08e-3) (2.24e-4) (2.71e-5) (2.51e-5)
R sq. 0.17 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.10
Adj. R sq. 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.09
The regression tests three different dependent variables; the skill premium, the ratio between high-skill and low-skill labor, and the wage bill share of low-skill labor. For each
of the three dependent variables, the regression equation is tested for three different categorizations of skill; more educated vs. less educated, white collar vs. blue collar, and skill
operatives vs. unskilled operatives. The results for the latter skill categorization are not significant, so are not shown here. The symbolds *, **, ***, and **** mean that the coeffiient





Table 7: Impact of capital goods imports on labor productivity
ASI LFS
Capital goods imports 7.80** 8.88**
(3.94) (5.30)
Capital stock -0.27*** -0.14
(0.09) (0.13)
Total inputs 0.35**** 0.51****
(0.08) (0.12)
Import share 0.002 -0.01
(0.002) (0.01)
Export share -0.006 -3.56e-4
(0.005) (0.01)
R sq. 0.26 0.46
Adj. R sq. 0.18 0.30
The dependent variable is labor productivity, which is defined as the ratio between value added and total employment
for a given industry. The regression is for total employment computed from the ASI (Annual Survey of Industries) and
the LFS (Labor Force Survey). The symbolds *, **, ***, and **** mean that the coeffiient estimates are significant at
the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
Table 8: Impact of capital goods imports on labor productivity: first difference
LFS ASI
∆ Capital goods imports 7.20** 5.67**
(3.62) (2.64)
∆ Capital stock -0.24* -0.30***
(0.13) (0.09)
∆ Total inputs 0.51**** 0.33****
(0.11) (0.08)
∆ Import share -0.01* 7.8e-4
(0.006) (0.002)
∆ Export share 0.002 -3.56e-4
(-0.01) (0.004)
R sq. 0.45 0.24
Adj. R sq. 0.41 0.23
The dependent variable is labor productivity, which is defined as the ratio between value added and total employment
for a given industry. The regression is for total employment computed from the ASI (Annual Survey of Industries) and
the LFS (Labor Force Survey). The symbolds *, **, ***, and **** mean that the coeffiient estimates are significant at
the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
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Wage Inequality and Occupational Tasks:






Rising wage inequality has been observed in developing countries that reduced industry
tariffs and liberalized their economies, contradicting traditional trade theory. Using labor force
survey data from Sri Lanka — a small open developing economy — this paper documents rising
wage polarization since the early 1990s; that is, wage inequality has increased in the upper half
of the distribution but decreased in the lower half. Moreover, these changes occurred at the level
of occupations rather than industries. Decomposing these wage changes reveals that the returns
to occupational tasks associated with technology spillovers and outsourcing have played a key
role in wage polarization. In particular, returns have increased to routine mechanized tasks
linked to low-wage occupations, and to information and communication tasks linked to high-
wage occupations. Both sets of tasks are found to be highly conducive to technology growth and
outsourcing. These results highlight the importance of considering occupation-specific skills, in
addition to schooling and work experience, when assessing the labor market impacts of greater
international competition.
∗This paper benefitted from the guidance of Richard Spady. This research was conducted with restricted access data




The empirical trade literature has documented rising wage inequality and skill premia in devel-
oping countries that opened their economies to foreign competition. This result is at odds with
traditional trade theory which predicts that the relative returns to low-skill labor should increase
in low-skill abundant countries. The previous literature on Sri Lanka — a small open devel-
oping country — finds evidence of the same (Karunaratna, 2007; Marjit and Acharyya, 2003).
However, using Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey data for the 1992-2009 period, this paper doc-
uments the more complex trend of wage polarization; that is, wage growth has been more rapid
at the upper and lower ends of the distribution relative to the middle. Further analysis reveals
that these changes have taken place within and between occupations rather than industries, even
though trade liberalization policies target the latter.
The role of occupations in the evolution of the wage distribution has only recently been
brought to attention. In the labor literature, Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) find that com-
puters replacing human routine tasks, as opposed to non-routine tasks, explains 60% of the
relative demand shift favoring college-educated workers in the US in the 1970-1998 period.
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) find that the 1990s wage polarization in the US can be ra-
tionalized by computerization of routine cognitive job tasks. Goos and Manning (2007) show
that job polarization in the UK can explain between one-third and one-half of the rise in wage
inequality during the 1975-1995 period. Yamaguchi (2013) finds that a decline in the returns
to motor skills relative to cognitive skills explains 40% of the narrowing gender-wage gap in
the US between 1979 and 1996. Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011) find evidence that techno-
logical change, de-unionization and outsourcing have each played a role in changes in the US
wage distribution at different time periods. In the trade literature, Artuc and McLaren (2012)
use US data to establish that both industry and occupation determine workers’ welfare changes
following a trade shock. The general consensus is that occupations are a potentially key chan-
nel through which technological change and international competition are driving the observed
changes in the wage distributions of developed countries.
It is then entirely plausible that occupations play a similarly crucial role in developing
economies. Skill-biased technical change (SBTC) as a by-product of trade liberalization is
a common explanation in the trade literature for rising wage inequality. Although it is standard
practice to associate SBTC with education levels, technology advancements raise the produc-
tivity of specific job tasks, not of educated workers across the board. For example, consider
technicians and human resources managers who have the same education level. Technology
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changes that facilitate hand-eye coordination will raise the productivity of technicians more
than that of HR managers, impacting the wage distribution between these two occupations.
Moreover, technicians with better hand-eye coordination will benefit more than those less en-
dowed with this particular skill, widening the wage distribution within the occupation. While
SBTC implies a monotonic relationship between technology and wages, linking technology
with tasks suggests that this relationship is ambiguous; for example, low-wage jobs involving
mechanized tasks are also conducive to technology-driven productivity growth.
A similar argument can be made for outsourcing, where jobs cross national borders. Sri
Lanka is a long-time outsourcing destination for low-wage manufacturing jobs, such as those
in the garment industry. More recently, outsourcing has come in the way of high-wage services
jobs in information and communications technology (ICT) and financial, business, and legal
services. The global shift away from manufacturing towards services along with organizational
restructuring and technical change have in general raised the emphasis of cognitive tasks, such
as people skills, relative to physical tasks, such as machine operation (Borghans, ter Weel, and
Weinberg, 2006). Thus, changes at the occupation level are potentially important drivers of
changes in wage inequality in developing economies.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the role of occupations in the evolution of Sri Lanka’s
wage distribution during the 1992-2009 period. To that end, a Roy model of occupational choice
is presented where the returns to distinct job skills differ across occupations. The key empirical
implication of the model is that the evolution of wages over time is determined by changes in
both the composition of and returns to job skills. This implication is tested using the decomposi-
tion method described in Machado and Mata (2005) using Sri Lanka Labor Force Survey (LFS)
data. Each occupation in the LFS is expressed as a set of constituent tasks intended to capture
its relationship with technology, outsourcing, and cognitive and physical skills. The mapping
between occupations and tasks is taken from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET).
The results show that changes in the returns to occupational tasks closely match the pattern
of wage polarization in Sri Lanka over this time period. This highlights the importance of
considering occupational tasks in future investigations of wage inequality in post-liberalization
economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents changes in the Sri Lankan wage
distribution and their relationship to industry and occupation trends. Section 3 describes a
model of occupational choice that links wages to job tasks and other labor-market characteris-
tics. Section 4 discusses the methods for empirically testing the model’s implications. Section
5 describes the use of O*NET data to map occupations to different sets of tasks. Section 6 gives
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the results from the decomposition, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Changes in the Wage Distribution
This section documents the evolution of Sri Lanka’s wage distribution over the 1992-2009 pe-
riod. The data is obtained from the Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey (LFS), conducted by the
Department of Census and Statistics. The LFS is a quarterly survey of approximately 5,000 na-
tionally representative households and extracts information from every household member on
wages, four-digit ISIC industry1, four-digit ISCO occupation2, hours worked, years of school-
ing completed, sex, race, work experience, and other characteristics. Nominal hourly wages are
computed from monthly or daily wages and weekly or daily hours worked3, and are converted
into year 2006 values using the GDP deflator.
Denote as w
q
t the median log hourly wage in a given quantile q of the wage distribution in






plots ∆wqt against w
q
0
using one hundred quantiles. The base and final years are, respectively,
1992 and 2009. Wage growth is strong at the upper and lower portions of the distribution
relative to the middle, taking a convex or U shape. To determine whether these changes are
statistically significant, the following regression is tested:







The convex shape in Figure 1 implies that α1t < 0 and α2t > 0. The equation is tested
separately for each t = 1993, ..., 2009 while holding the base year, t = 0, fixed at 1992.
Figure 2 plots the estimated linear and square coefficients for each year. The coefficients take
on the predicted signs and become larger in magnitude over time. This implies that wages
have become more polarized over time relative to the base year. All but one of the coefficient
estimates are highly significant and the R-squared values range from 0.53 to 0.85. Thus, Sri
Lanka has experienced gradually rising wage inequality in the upper half of the distribution and
falling inequality in the lower.
If international competition and technical change are driving these economy-wide changes,
then they should arguably be driving changes in the industry wage structure or occupation wage
structure (or both). For example, the structural trade literature has long established that a tariff
1ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification
2International Standard Classification of Occupations




cut in one industry affects relative wages across all industries.4 Similarly, Autor, Levy, and
Murnane (2003) find that computerization lowers (raises) the relative return to routine (non-
routine) cognitive occupations. Thus, the next step is to determine whether wage trends at the
industry and occupation level mimic the economy-wide trends. This is tested with the following
regression:
∆wjt = α0t + α1twj0 + α2tw
2
j0 + ǫjt (2)
where j stands for industry or occupation, and wjt is the median wage in industry/occupation
j at time t. The expectation is that α1t < 0 and α2t > 0. Industries and occupations are
aggregated to the three-digit level to ensure a sufficient number of observations to compute the
median wage. As before, the equation is tested separately for each t while holding the base year
fixed at 1992.5
Figure 3 plots the coefficient estimates for industries, while Figure 4 does the same for
occupations. For both industries and occupations, α1t < 0 and α2t > 0, implying a convex
relationship between wage growth and base-year wages. However, the effects are stronger for
occupations as evidenced by the larger coefficient magnitudes. Moreover, the coefficients have
increased in magnitude over time, suggesting that wage polarization has been a gradual process
over the eighteen-year data span. The coefficients are statistically significant, but more so for
occupations than for industries.6
Thus, the evolution of the industry and occupation wage structures closely match that of the
economy-wide distribution, although the results are stronger for occupations. However, these
results say nothing about the specific industries and occupations that are contributing to these
trends. If, for example, computerization enhances productivity in the finance industry, then the
finance industry would contribute to rising wages at the upper end of the economy-wide wage
distribution. Moreover, if computerization complements the most skilled workers, then wage
inequality would increase within the finance industry. Therefore, the next section determines
which specific industries and occupations have contributed to wage polarization.
4Refer to Artuc (2009), Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), Cosar (2013), Dix-Carneiro (2013), and Seneviratne
(2013).
5For industries, the equation is tested only for t = 1992, ..., 2001. This is because the LFS uses ISIC Revision 2 for
1992-2001 and Revision 3 for 2002-2009. The mapping between Revision 2 to 3 is not straightforward, so the latter years
are omitted.
6The t-statistics range from 1.7 to 7.6 for industries, and from 3.1 to 10.4 for occupations.
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2.1 Changes Within Industries and Occupations
To examine changes across and within industries and occupations, the wage distribution of each
industry/occupation j is divided into ten quantiles (deciles). The median wage in each quantile
of industry/occupation j is computed. The regression equation is:





where ∆wqjt is the change in the median wage in quantile q of industry or occupation j between
the years 0 and t, and wqj0 is the base-year median wage in quantile q. The coefficients vary
with j.7 The slope coefficient, γj1, captures changes across and within industries/occupations.
For instance, if γj1 > 0, then wage growth was stronger for higher quantiles, increasing wage
inequality within j. If γj1 > γj′1 > 0, then wage growth was stronger and inequality grew
faster in j than in j′. Industries and occupations are aggregated to the two-digit level to allow
for sufficient observations per wage quantile. Figure 5 plots the fitted values of ∆wqjt against
w
q
j0 for industries, and Figure 6 does the same for occupations. Each plot is labeled with the
corresponding ISIC or ISCO title.
The industry plots (Figure 5) show no clear pattern to indicate that wage changes across
or within industries are driving wage polarization. However, some trends are worth noting.
Inequality has risen in services industries associated with high levels of education and/or spe-
cialized training, as evidenced by their upward-sloping plots (γj1 > 0); for example, ‘social
and community services’ (which includes medical services and scientific research), ‘financial
institutions’, and ‘real estate and business services’. In contrast, the plots are downward-sloping
for services industries associated with low education levels and training (γj1 < 0); for example,
‘restaurants and hotels’, ‘retail trade’, and ‘personal and household services’. The distinction
between these two sets of industries lies primarily in job quality and skills, which are more
closely related to occupations than industries.
Indeed, the occupation plots (Figure 6) show a clear U-shaped pattern of wage growth.
High-wage occupations have experienced rising inequality as evidenced by their positive slopes;
for example, ‘physical, mathematical and engineering professionals’ and ‘other professionals’
(which includes lawyers, accountants, and psychologists). Low-wage occupations show falling
inequality; for example, ‘salespersons’ and ‘machine operators’. Middle-wage occupations
have relatively flat slopes (γj1 ≈ 0), implying little to no change in inequality; for example,
7γj0 is a vector of j-specific dummies while γj1 · w
q
j0 is a vector of j-specific dummies interacted with base-year
wage in quantile q of j.
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‘drivers and mobile-plant operators’ and ‘metal and machinery workers’ (which includes air-
craft mechanics and tool-makers). 8
2.2 Discussion
The above results suggest that changes at the occupation rather than industry level are driving
economy-wide wage polarization. Moreover, changes across and within occupations appear
to be simultaneously contributing to these trends. Some notable similarities exist amongst
occupations sharing common wage growth patterns. In the upper portion of the distribution,
occupations that have experienced rising inequality are those that require highly specialized
professional qualifications involving technical and analytical skills (e.g. MD, MBA, JD). Thus,
the best-paid science technicians, lawyers and accountants, for example, also enjoyed the high-
est wage growth. The technical nature of these jobs suggests that they are likely to benefit from
technology spillovers from abroad. Moreover, many high-wage services occupations are now
outsourced. For example, Sri Lanka is a growing outsourcing destination for ICT, business and
legal services jobs.
In the lower part of the distribution, occupations experiencing falling inequality are routine
manufacturing and services jobs. Thus, salespersons and machine operators earning low wages
enjoyed the highest wage growth. Many routine jobs, such as those in the garment and textile
industries, are outsourced to developing countries. In addition, jobs that involve the use of
machinery are conducive to technology advancements.
Thus, one of the main goals of this paper is to formally identify the specific features of
occupations that might help explain wage polarization. To that end, the next section develops
a model of occupational choice where occupations are disaggregated into the tasks and skills
required to perform them. The model is then tested using a decomposition exercise that iso-
lates the relative contributions of these tasks/skills and other worker characteristics to wage
polarization.
8Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix A plot the fitted values of ∆wdjt from the same as above regression, but with quantiles




3 Occupational Choice Model
3.1 Model
This section describes a Roy model of occupational choice that links wages to occupational
tasks. Assume that individuals are endowed with K types of skill. For example, if K = 2,
these could be ‘analytical’ (k = 1) and ‘routine’ skills (k = 2). Each individual possesses
different stocks of these skills accumulated through education, training, work experience, etc.
The vector of skills for individual i at time t is sit = (si1t, ..., siKt).
Individuals can choose to work in one of many occupations in the economy. Each occu-
pation j is disaggregated into a bundle of tasks. Define as mj = (mj1, ...,mjK) the vector
of K task indices that capture the task content of occupation j. For example, if the skill types
are ‘analytical’ and ‘routine’ (K = 2), then each occupation is defined by an analytical and
routine task index. Each task index, mjk, can be thought of as the relative importance of task k
in occupation j.














and the log wage is:




where βjkt is the return to skill type k in occupation j, and ǫijt is an idiosyncratic shock to
wages. The intercept, αjt, and slope terms, (βj1t, ..., βjKt), all vary with occupation and time.
Thus, the return to an individual’s stock of skills differs across occupations.
To allow for additional worker characteristics such as education and sex to determine wages,
the log wage equation is rewritten as:
ln(wijt) = αjt +
K∑
k=1
βjktsikt + γjtZit + ǫijt (4)
where Zit is a vector of individual i’s other labor force characteristics and γjt is a vector of
time-varying returns to Zit.
Since each occupation is defined as a bundle of tasks, βjkt can be expressed as a function
of task index mjk in occupation j:
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βjkt = β̃jkt(mjk) (5)
where β̃jkt > 0. The interpretation is that the return to skill type k depends on the relevance
of that skill to occupation j. For example, analytical skills have little relevance to a manual
laborer. Therefore, the return to analytical skills is low for all individuals who choose to be
manual laborers.
3.2 Empirical implications
The model yields a set of empirical implications that will be tested under the decomposition
exercise in Section 5. Changes in the return to skill type k will affect the wage distribution
across and within occupations. This, in turn, will affect the economy-wide wage distribution.
For example, suppose a technology advancement raises the return to analytical skills in all oc-
cupations. Consider a low-wage occupation, ‘machine operator’ (j = 1), and a high-wage
occupation, ‘computer programmer’ (j = 2). Assume that the analytical tasks are of greater
relative importance for programmers than for machine operators; m1k < m2k. If so, a tech-
nology advancement will raise the return to analytical skills in both occupations, β1k and β2k.
However, because m1k < m2k, wage growth will be higher for programmers than for machine
operators, widening the wage gap between the two occupations. Moreover, for a given occu-
pation, individuals possessing higher stocks of analytical skills will enjoy higher wage growth,
widening wage inequality within occupations. As evidenced by Figure 6, both changes across
and within occupations can drive the overall pattern of wage growth.
Changes in the distribution of skills have a similar effect. Suppose that education policy
reform pushes individuals to invest more in analytical skills. The greater supply of analytical
skills in the workforce will lower the relative returns to analytical skills. The wage gap between
programmers and machine operators will fall. However, empirical evidence shows that the
positive impact of education increases with wages.9 This is because wage dispersion tends to
widen at higher levels of skill. Thus, greater investment in analytical skills could raise wage
inequality through this dispersion effect. The net impact of a change in workforce composition
on the wage distribution is therefore an empirical question.
The purpose of the decomposition exercise is to measure the relative contributions of changes
in skill returns and changes in workforce composition to wage polarization. Defining occupa-
tions as bundles of tasks allows for identifying common features amongst occupations that share
9See Lemieux (2006) for the US and Biagetti and Scicchitano (2011) for Europe.
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similar wage growth patterns. Moreover, because the number of tasks in O*NET is far below
the number of occupations, the task approach allows for more parsimonious empirical speci-
fications than using hundreds of occupation-specific dummies. The next section describes the
construction of occupational task indices using O*NET data.
4 Task Data
The task content of occupations is taken from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET)
developed by the Employment and Training Administration of the US Department of Labor.10
O*NET assigns to each occupation numeric measures of the knowledge, skills and abilities
required to perform the job, as well as the activities and tasks that constitute performing it.
For example, O*NET provides a list of ‘work activities’ for each occupation j, and then
assigns two numbers for each work activity; one for its ‘importance’ and another for its ‘level’.
For the work activity defined as ‘performing for or working directly with the public’, O*NET
assigns an ‘importance’ score of 0.46 for actors and 0.38 for fire-fighters, and a ‘level’ score of
0.8 for actors and 0.64 for fire-fighters. Engaging with the public is thus more important and
more intensively performed for actors than for fire-fighters.
The O*NET measures are used to construct several task indices intended to capture the
occupational features that might be driving changes in the wage distribution. One set of task
indices captures an occupation’s exposure to outsourcing, called ‘offshorability’. Following
Jensen and Kletzer (2005), five offshorability indices are constructed: ‘information’, ‘physical
presence’, ‘interpersonal’, ‘decision/creativity’, and ‘routine’. Each index, TI , is constructed


















where TIjk is the value of index k in occupation j. The terms Lk and Mk are the total numbers
of work activities and work contexts, respectively, used to construct index k. The terms IMjl
and LVjl are the importance and level, respectively, of work activity l in occupation j, and Cjm





are assigned for ‘importance’ and ‘level’, respectively. Table 1 lists the work activities and
work contexts used to construct each of the five indices.
10O*NET is the replacement to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).
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The ‘information’ index captures the use of data, information and the internet in an occu-
pation. Jobs in information and communications technology (ICT) are heavily outsourced with
Sri Lanka being an increasingly important destination country. ‘Physical presence’ captures the
necessity of a worker’s on-site presence in the work environment to fulfill his job requirements.
Because jobs requiring less physical presence are easier to outsource, the inverse of ‘physical
presence’ is used to capture offshorability. ‘Interpersonal’ captures the extent of face-to-face
interaction, and ‘decision/creativity’ the extent of independent decision-making and creativity.
Because jobs entailing face-to-face interaction and high-level decision-making are difficult to
outsource, the inverse values of these indices are used to capture offshorability. ‘Routine’ cap-
tures the extent of performing repetitive tasks. Many routine jobs, such as cellphone assembler,
are outsourced to developing countries since they require little specialized training.
Another set of task indices is constructed to capture skill-biased technical change (SBTC).
Previous empirical studies suggest that SBTC has raised the returns to cognitive skills relative
to physical skills, especially with advancements in computer technology.11 Therefore, two task











where Ajl is the numeric value of ability l in occupation j, and Sjm is the numeric value of
skill m in occupation j. These are similar to the indices constructed in Yamaguchi (2013) using
DOT data. Table 2 lists the abilities and skills included for each index.
Table 3 gives the mean values by major ISCO occupation group for each task index con-
structed. The occupations are ranked by median wage. 12 The highest information task content
is found for ‘technicians and associate professionals’ and ‘clerks’.13 The most routine jobs are
‘plant machine operators and assemblers’ and ‘skilled agricultural and fishery workers’. The
latter group also has the highest score for on-site physical presence. Tasks involving inde-
11See Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Yamaguchi (2013).
12O*NET uses the Standard Occupational Classification 2010 (SOC-2010) system while the Sri Lankan Labour Force
Survey (LFS) uses the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-1988). Therefore, a concordance
mapping between SOC-2010 and ISCO-1988 is constructed using the mapping between SOC-2010 and ISCO-2008,
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the mapping between ISCO-2008 and ISCO-1988, provided by
the International Labour Organization (ILO). At the most disaggregated level, the SOC-2010 has 840 occupations while
the ISCO-1988 has 672. Therefore, for any one-to-many mappings from SOC-2010 to ISCO-88, the same O*NET task
content value is assigned to all corresponding ISCO-1988 occupations.




pendent decision-making are most relevant for ‘Legislators, senior officials and managers’ and
least relevant for ‘elementary occupations’. The former group also has the lowest routine and
physical presence task content. The interpersonal task content is highest for ‘legislators’ and
‘clerks’.
Physical skills are most relevant for ‘skilled agricultural/fishery workers’ and least relevant
for ‘professionals’. In general, low-wage occupations involve low levels of cognitive skill;
for example, ‘service, shop and sales workers’ and ‘elementary occupations’. Cognitive skills
are most relevant for ‘clerks’. This occupation includes statisticians and accounting clerks for
whom mathematical ability is important. Cognitive skills are also important for legislators,
managers, and technicians. Because SBTC has been found to raise the relative return to cogni-
tive skills, the ratio between cognitive and physical skills is used in the empirical section.
5 Decomposition
This section describes the procedure for decomposing Sri Lanka’s wage polarization into dis-
tinct contributing factors. Specifically, changes in the wage distribution are decomposed into
changes in the composition of and returns to different workforce characteristics (which include
occupational tasks). This method allows for distinguishing whether, for example, changes in
educational attainment or changes in the returns to education had a greater role to play in wage
polarization. It is also possible to determine whether changes in education mattered more than
changes in labor-market tenure. The decomposition method and its empirical implementation
is described in detail below.
5.1 Decomposing changes in the wage distribution
Let f(wt) be the density of log hourly wage, w, in year t. Then let ν(f(wt)) be a summary
statistic of interest of f(wt). For example, ν(·) could be the mean, median, variance, skewness,
uth quantile, etc. of f(wt). The goal is to decompose the change in ν(f(wt)) from some base
year t = 0 to some final year t = 1. Let ∆ν be the overall change from t = 0 to t = 1 in the
distributional statistic ν:
∆ν = ν(f(w1))− ν(f(w0))
where f(w0) and f(w1) are the wage densities at t = 0 and t = 1, respectively. This can de-
composed into a ‘composition effect’ and a ‘coefficient effect’. The composition effect captures
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changes in the distribution of workforce characteristics, while the coefficient effect captures
changes in the returns to workforce characteristics:










The term ν(f(w1)|X(0)) is the wage distribution that would have prevailed at t = 1 if all
workforce characteristics had been distributed as at t = 0. This measures the contribution of
all characteristics simultaneously to changes in the wage distribution.
The contribution of a single characteristic (e.g. education) can be measured in a similar
manner. Denoting this characteristic as y, the decomposition can be expressed as:










The term ν(f(w1)|y(0)) is the wage distribution that would have prevailed at t = 1 if
characteristic y has been distributed as at t = 0. Thus, for any statistic of interest, ∆ν, the
composition effect and coefficient effect can be measured for each independent variable in the
wage equation (Equation 4) .
5.2 Empirical procedure
The decomposition described above requires the construction of counterfactual wage distribu-
tions, f(w1)|y(0), which give the wages that would have prevailed at t = 1 if characteristic
y has been distributed as at t = 0. The counterfactuals are constructed using the method of
Machado and Mata (2005) which utilizes quantile regressions.
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Let Qun(w|X) be quantile un of the distribution of wages, w, given a vector of character-
istics, X . The relationship between w and X in quantile un is:
Qun(w|X) = X
′β(un)
where β(un) is a vector of coefficients specific to quantile un. The construction of f(w1)|y(0)
proceeds as follows:
1. Determine the number of quantiles, N , with which to divide the total wage distribution.
Generate a random sample of size N from the uniform distribution U(0, 1): u1, u2, ..., uN .
2. Estimate the log wage equation at t = 1 (the final year) for each quantile, un:
Qun(w|X(1)) = X
′β(un)
The term Qun(w|X(1)) is quantile un of the wage distribution at t = 1 given the vector
of characteristics, X(1), prevailing at t = 1. Save the estimated coefficients β̂(un) for
each quantile un.





The symbol ∗ indicates that the sample was randomly generated.





for each quantile un, n = 1, ..., N .
5. Choose the characteristic of interest, y, and partition its space into P categories. (For
example, if y is age, then construct P = 5 categories of 15 − 24, 25 − 34, ..., 55 − 64.)
Denote as fp the relative frequency of category p at t = 1. Then select the subset of
observations in category p from the constructed distribution {w∗n(1)}
N
n=1. (For example,
if p = 1, select the subset of individuals aged 15-24 from the constructed distribution at
t = 1.) Denote this subset as {w∗pn (1)}
N
n=1.
6. From {w∗pn (1)}
N
n=1, generate a random sample, with replacement, of size equal to the
number of observations in category p at t = 0. (For example, if there are 2,000 people






7. Repeat steps 5 and 6 for all P categories of characteristic y.
The above procedure generates the counterfactual distribution f(w1)|y(0) for characteristic
y. All other characteristics are assumed to be distributed as at t = 1.
5.3 Estimating equation
Step 2 in the decomposition procedure requires estimating the wage equation for different quan-
tiles. The model of occupational choice in Section 3 gives the following wage equation:
ln(wijt) = αjt +
K∑
k=1
βjktsikt + γjtZit + ǫijt
where sikt is individual i’s endowment of skill in task k at time t. Unfortunately, the LFS does
not contain information on individuals’ endowments of task-specific skills. The LFS being a re-
peated cross section, this information cannot be constructed from occupational histories either.
However, all that is required for the decomposition exercise is to distinguish between changes
in the returns to tasks and changes in the composition of tasks in the workforce. Thus, as long
as there is variation across the workforce in the task content of occupations, the estimating
equation for wage quantile u can be written as:
ln(wi,u) = α0,u +
K∑
k=1
βk,uTIik + γuZi + ǫi,u (8)
where the skill endowments, sikt, are replaced with the task indices, TIik. The vector Z con-
tains potential experience and its squared term, sex, and years of schooling.14 The wage distri-
bution is divided into 99 quantiles. Two specifications of Equation 8 are tested. The first uses
the five offshorability task indices and the second uses the cognitive ratio (the ratio between the
cognitive and physical task indices).
6 Results
This section describes the results of the decomposition exercise. Section 6.1 describes the
estimated coefficients for the quantile regressions, and Section 6.2 describes the composition
and coefficient effects.
14Potential experience is computed as age minus years of schooling.
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6.1 Quantile regression coefficients
Offshorable tasks
Figure 7 compares the estimated quantile regression coefficients for 1992 (base year) and 2009
(final year). The coefficient estimates (solid lines) and their 95% confidence intervals (dotted
lines) are plotted against quantile number. The plots show that males earn more than females
across all jobs, but that this gender gap is smaller for high-wage occupations. Figure 8 shows
the coefficients for all years (1992-2009) and the plots are drawn to become darker with time;
i.e. the lightest (darkest) lines represent the earliest (latest) years. The gender gap is shown
to have risen over the 18-year time period with the most acute change occurring for low-wage
jobs. This implies that male wage inequality has decreased relative to female wage inequality.
The effect of education on wages has changed quite dramatically (Figure 7). In 1992, the
positive impact of education on wage gets smaller at higher quantiles, suggesting that education
decreases wage inequality. In 2009, however, the trend is almost reversed; education has a
greater positive impact at higher quantiles. This reversal over time is even more evident in
Figure 8. Thus, education has contributed to greater wage inequality over time.
The positive coefficient on potential experience and the negative coefficient on its squared
term both increase in magnitude over time, and this effect is strongest in the middle of the wage
distribution. Thus, even after controlling for education, experience-wage profiles have become
more concave over time; this means that, compared to the early 1990s, wages rose more steeply
for younger workers and declined more rapidly for older workers in the late 2000s.15
Turning to the offshorability task measures, Figure 7 shows that the positive wage return to
information tasks declines with quantile. Moreover, returns have increased for the middle and
upper portions of the wage distribution, and has fallen for the lower. Firpo et al. (2011) report
an almost identical trend for the US. A plausible explanation is that new information and com-
munication technology (ICT) has substituted low-skill workers in favor of high-skill workers
since the latter are complements to ICT. Moreover, the literature attributes developments in ICT
to the outsourcing of middle-skill jobs in developed countries. Since developing country skill
distributions lie below those of developed countries, this outsourcing should benefit the middle-
and high-skill workers of the recipient countries.
15Similar trends have been documented for developed countries. Steeper wage profiles are usually attributed to greater
human capital, all else equal (Becker, 1994). For example, Kredler (2008) documents a rise in the ‘experience premium’
in Germany for the 1975-2001 period and, in a companion paper, attributes this to new technologies that lead to faster
wage growth for young workers. Thus, the increasing concavity of the wage-experience profiles in Sri Lanka may be due
to technological change, better on-the-job training, and other factors that raise human capital above and beyond schooling.
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The wage returns to routine tasks are negative, implying that the greater the routine content
of a job, the lower the wage. The returns show a marked decline over time, and this decline
is strongest for the lower portion of the distribution. One possible explanation is routine jobs
became have become mechanized as a result of technology changes, substituting humans in
favor of machines. Since low-skill workers are more likely to hold routine jobs, they thus
experienced the largest wage declines. Another explanation is that the expansion of the services
sector in Sri Lanka has corresponded with growth in non-routine jobs. Services job growth
may also be a consequence of outsourcing since Sri Lanka is a popular destination for finance,
business processing and ICT jobs which are typically non-routine.
Note that the trends for both information and routine tasks can be attributed simply to tech-
nology changes, not necessarily outsourcing. Therefore, for the decomposition exercise, these
two task indices are summed up to construct a separate ‘technology’ index to evaluate the po-
tential role of technology advancements to changes in the wage distribution.
The returns to (the inverse of) decision-making and creative tasks have increased over time.
This increase is stronger for the middle and upper portions of the distribution. This is consis-
tent with the outsourcing prediction; jobs that require less independent decision-making and
creativity are more likely to be shipped to low-skill abundant countries like Sri Lanka.The in-
verse of the physical presence index shows decreasing returns over time. This contradicts the
outsourcing hypothesis; if outsourcing has grown over time in Sri Lanka, jobs requiring less
face-to-face interaction and on-site physical presence should have experienced higher wage re-
turns since they are easier to outsource. The interpersonal index does not show a clear pattern
of change over time.
The coefficient estimates are statistically significant for each of the 99 quantiles. The over-
all results point to large changes over time in the returns to occupational tasks and demographic
characteristics. Furthermore, these changes have varied considerably across wage quantiles,
contributing to either increased or decreased wage inequality between different points of the
distribution. The decomposition below will explicitly measure the contribution of each inde-
pendent variable to changes in the economy-wide wage distribution.
Cognitive and physical skills
The bottom panels in Figures 7 and Figure 8 plot the estimated coefficients for the cognitive
ratio (the ratio between cognitive and physical skills required in an occupation). The relative
return to cognitive skills has increased markedly over time for the middle and upper portions
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of the wage distribution and has declined for the lower tail. These trends may be indicative
of skill-biased technical change (SBTC) that either complements cognitive skills or substitutes
physical skills, or both.16
Jobs that typically pay low wages have low cognitive ratios. Table 3 shows that the bottom
five occupation groups ranked by wage have average cognitive ratios in the range of 0.93-1.14,
while the top four occupation groups have a range of 1.61-2.97. If SBTC substitutes physical
skills and complements cognitive skills, then it should put downward pressure on wages in
low-wage jobs and upward pressure for high-wage jobs. 17
6.2 Decomposition
Aggregate effects
The first decomposition exercise considers all workforce characteristics simultaneously. The
composition effect is therefore ν(f∗(w1)) − ν(f
∗(w1)|X(0)), and the coefficient effect is
ν(f∗(w1)|X(0)) − ν(f
∗(w0)). The term X(0) denotes the workforce characteristics in the
base year (1992).
Table 4 reports the results for the offshorability regressions. The first column lists the names
of the distributional statistics of interest, ν(·); the median log hourly wage for several quantiles,
and the mean and variance. The second and third columns show the estimated statistics for
the base and final years, respectively, along with their bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Column 4 shows the change in the estimated statistics between 1992 and 2009, ν(f∗(w1)) −
ν(f∗(w0)), along with the bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for those changes. The numbers
show that the largest changes have taken place at the lower and upper portions of the wage
distribution, with the smallest changes in the middle. This confirms that Sri Lanka experienced
wage polarization between 1992 and 2009.
The last two columns show the composition and coefficient effect along with their bootstrap
95% confidence intervals. The composition effect is weak, contributing relatively little to wage
changes between 1992 and 2009. The change in log hourly wage ranges from 0.028 to 0.075,
which translates to wage growth of 2.8-7.5%. Moreover, the confidence intervals are large and
include zero for all of the statistics. In contrast, the coefficient effect is strong, contributing
to log wage changes in the range of 0.22-0.36 or wage growth of 22-36%. Moreover, the
16Yamaguchi (2013) finds evidence of a relative decline in the return to physical skills in the US, and attributes this to
the closing gender wage gap since men have greater relative endowments of physical skills.
17Note that while occupations at the very top of the wage distribution have a high cognitive component, many do not
have a significant technical component (e.g. legislators, teachers). This may explain why the upper end of the distribution
has experienced only a modest rise in the relative return to cognitive skills.
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confidence intervals are narrow and do not include zero for any statistic except variance. The
coefficient effect takes on a U-shape, matching the pattern of wage polarization in the economy.
For example, wage growth is larger at quantiles 10 and 90 than at quantile 50. The composition
effect does not show such a pattern.
The first panel of Figure 9 shows these same results visually. The coefficient effect plot-
ted against quantile is U-shaped and is virtually superimposed on the plot showing total wage
changes. In contrast, the plot for the composition effect is relatively flat across quantiles and
lies substantially beneath the coefficient effect. This is a strong indication that wage polar-
ization between 1992 and 2009 occurred primarily due to changes in the returns to workforce
characteristics, rather than changes in the composition of those characteristics.
Table 5 reports the results for the cognitive ratio regressions. Both the composition and
coefficient effects are of similar magnitude, suggesting that both effects contributed equally to
changes in the wage distribution. The first panel of Figure 10 shows this result visually. The
coefficient effect again takes on the familiar U shape. However, the confidence intervals are
wide for all statistics (Table 5), and the coefficient effect in particular is much weaker here than
for the offshorability specification.
These results provide preliminary evidence that changes related to outsourcing and technol-
ogy spillovers played a key role in the evolution of Sri Lanka’s wage distribution. In the next
section, the individual contributions of workforce characteristics are assessed.
Individual characteristics: composition effect
For a given workforce characteristic, y, the composition effect is ν(f∗(w1))− ν(f
∗(w1)|y(0))
and the coefficient effect is ν(f∗(w1)|y(0)) − ν(f
∗(w0)), where y(0) denotes the distribution
of characteristic y in the base year (1992). Table 6 reports the composition effects. The first
entry in each cell gives the estimated composition effect, and the second and third entries are
its bootstrap standard error and 95% confidence interval, respectively.
Education is the only variable with a strong composition effect. The effect is positive and
significant at all quantiles and is larger for the upper quantiles, suggesting that rising educational
attainment has increased wage inequality through the dispersion effect.18 Indeed, the last cell
in the ‘Education’ column shows that changes in educational attainment had a positive and
significant effect on wage dispersion. Potential experience and sex had a negative composition
effect on the wage distribution, although their impact is weak; the standard errors are large
18See Section 3.2 for a discussion.
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and the confidence intervals include zero. This suggests an increase in the ratio of women
to men in the workforce and a decline in labor-market tenure. The former is supported by
the raw LFS data; the proportion of women in the workforce has increased from 30.3% in
1992 to 35.9% in 2009. The decline in labor-market tenure is a likely consequence of greater
educational attainment which delays labor market entry. The second panel of Figure 9 shows
these results visually. The composition effect for education most closely matches the pattern of
wage polarization.
The composition effects are also weak for the offshorability task indices. Column 5 of Ta-
ble 6, titled ‘Offshorability’, gives the aggregate effect of all five task indices. Column 6, titled
‘Technology’, gives the combined effect of the information and routine task indices.19 Column
7, titled ‘Human’, gives the combined effects of (the inverse values of) the physical presence,
interpersonal and decision task indices. Together, they capture the hands-off nature of an oc-
cupation. The results show that the composition effects for ‘offshorability’, ‘technology’ and
‘human’ are not statistically significant. However, ‘offshorability’ and ‘technology’ show pos-
itive changes for all quantiles, suggesting an increase in outsourced and technology-conducive
jobs in the economy. The third panel of Figure 9 confirms these results; none of the plots match
the pattern of wage polarization.
The composition effect for the cognitive ratio is shown in the last column of Table 6 and the
second panel of Figure 10. The individual effects are weak, which is not surprising given the
weak aggregate effects.
In conclusion, education is the only variable that has had a statistically significant com-
position effect on the wage distribution. However, while greater educational attainment has
contributed to greater wage inequality by increasing wage dispersion at the upper quantiles, it
cannot explain wage polarization. Thus, Sri Lanka’s wage polarization cannot be attributed to
changes in the composition of its workforce.
Individual characteristics: coefficient effect
Table 7 shows the results for the individual coefficient effects. Unlike the composition effects,
the coefficient effects are large in magnitude and highly significant (except for variance). The
returns to education, labor-market tenure and males (relative to females) have increased over
time for all quantiles of the wage distribution. The fourth panel of Figure 9 shows that these
changes take on a convex shape, matching the general pattern of wage polarization, although the




education effect flattens out somewhat at the top half of the distribution. Comparing this to the
second panel of Figure 9 shows that the returns to demographic characteristics have contributed
much more to wage polarization than the composition of the these characteristics.
The results for offshorability are even stronger. Panel 5 of Figure 9 shows that the coefficient
effect for each offshorable task index closely mimics both the pattern and magnitude of wage
polarization. Table 7 shows that the effects for ‘offshorability’, ‘technology’ and ‘human’ are all
large and significant, suggesting that structural changes related to outsourcing and technology
are a driving force behind Sri Lanka’s wage polarization. This, along with the almost negligible
composition effect, points to demand-driven — rather than supply-driven — changes in the
labor market. This aligns with the findings of the structural trade literature; that labor supply is
slow to adjust to trade policy changes.20
The pattern of wage polarization and the offshorability coefficient effects also coincide with
the wage changes documented between and within occupations (Figure 6). This prompts the
following question: do the occupations most susceptible to outsourcing and technical change
lie at the extremes of the wage distribution? Table 8 lists the fifteen occupations with the
highest offshorability scores along with each occupation’s rank by base-year median wage.
The occupations are disaggregated to the three-digit level (giving a total of 107 occupations).
Of the 15 most information-related occupations, all but one ranks in the top half of the wage
distribution. These include some of the most lucrative professions (e.g. business professionals,
lawyers, engineers, doctors). Figure 5 shows that these occupations experienced both high wage
growth and greater wage inequality, meaning that the best-paid workers enjoyed the highest
wage growth. Recall from the quantile regressions that wages are positively correlated with
information content (Section 6.1). Thus, if outsourcing brought ICT jobs to Sri Lanka, wages
should rise disproportionately at the top of the distribution.
In contrast, most occupations with a high routine content lie in the lower half of the wage
distribution. Notably, they involve the operation of industrial machinery. Figure 5 shows that
these occupations experienced high wage growth but lower wage inequality, meaning that the
lowest-paid workers enjoyed the highest wage growth. Recall from the quantile regressions that
wages are negatively correlated with routine content. Thus, if outsourcing brought routine jobs
to Sri Lanka — such as those in the garment industry — wages should rise at the bottom of the
20While a one-time, one-sector trade policy change instantly alters (relative) wage returns across all sectors, labor
supply requires an adjustment period of 30-80 years (Artuc, 2009; Artuc et al., 2010; Cosar, 2013; Dix-Carneiro, 2013;
Seneviratne, 2013). This is because it is costly for the workforce to switch sectors and acquire new skills. It is therefore
plausible that, over a relatively short 18-year time span, structural changes linked to international competition impact
wage returns much more strongly than workforce composition.
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distribution. Moreover, both ICT and routine occupations are conducive to technical change,
further contributing to wage growth at the extremes.
Of the 15 occupations requiring the least amount of on-site physical presence, 13 are in
the top half of the wage distribution and include well-paid professions that are commonly out-
sourced; e.g. business service agents.21 Meanwhile, occupations requiring little face-to-face
interaction and independent decision-making and creativity are mostly low-wage; some of these
are heavily outsourced — e.g. textile and garment workers, computing professionals. Thus, de-
pending on which offshorability index is used, the most offshorable occupations are clustered
at the lower or upper portion of the wage distribution. This suggests that the five offshora-
bility indices combined provide a quite comprehensive measure of occupations’ exposure to
international competition.
These results also have a key implication for future research. In trying to explain rising
wage inequality in developing countries, the trade literature typically links skill-biased technical
change to education levels. Yet, the decomposition results suggest that SBTC may be better
linked to occupational task content, which is not necessarily correlated with years of schooling
or educational milestones (e.g. high-school diploma, college degree, etc.)
7 Conclusion
In light of rising wage inequality observed in developing countries that liberalized their economies,
this paper evaluates changes in the wage distribution of Sri Lanka. Using labor force survey
data, rising wage polarization is documented for the 1992-2009 time period. This means that
wage inequality increased in the upper half of the distribution but decreased in the lower half.
Further investigation shows this trend matches wage growth patterns across and within oc-
cupations rather than industries, even though international competition is typically linked to
industry-wide changes.
To formally link wages with occupations, a Roy model of occupational choice is presented
where each occupation is broken down into its constituent tasks and skill requirements. An
important feature of the model is that wage returns to distinct job tasks and skills vary across
occupations and time. The model generates a key empirical implication; that changes in both
the returns to tasks and the composition of tasks in the workforce can drive the complex patterns
of wage growth observed in Sri Lanka. This implication is tested using a decomposition method




adapted from Machado and Mata (2005). The results show that occupational tasks related to
technological change and outsourcing have strong explanatory power for Sri Lanka’s wage
polarization.
Importantly, it is the change in wage returns rather than in workforce composition that
appears to be driving these trends. This concurs with a now established finding in the structural
trade literature; that workforce composition is slow to respond to trade policies that alter the
wage returns to individual skill.
The main finding in this paper is that occupation-based tasks and skills play an important
role in changes in wage inequality, even after accounting for education and work experience.
This has an important implication for future research. The trade literature usually looks to
traditional measures of skill, such as education, when explaining changes in wage inequality,
especially when attributing skill-biased technical change (SBTC) to these changes. Yet, the
results in this paper provide strong evidence that greater international competition and technol-
ogy spillovers can impact the economy-wide wage structure through an additional dimension
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Figure 1: Wage growth, 1992-2009
Figure 2: Estimated wage changes, 1992-2009
The results are for the regression equation ∆w
q








t where w is log hourly wage and j
stands for three-digit ISIC industry. The regression is weighted by the industry-specific employment numbers in the base
year (1992). The figure plots the estimates of α1t and α2t for each year (t).
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Figure 3: Estimated industry wage changes, 1992-2009
The results are for the regression equation ∆wjt = α0t +α1twj0 +α2tw
2
j0 + ǫjt where w is log hourly wage and j
stands for three-digit ISIC industry. The regression is weighted by the industry-specific employment numbers in the base
year (1992). The figure plots the estimates of α1t and α2t for each year (t).
Figure 4: Estimated occupation wage changes, 1992-2009
The results are for the regression equation ∆wjt = α0t +α1twj0 +α2tw
2
j0 + ǫjt where w is log hourly wage and j
stands for three-digit ISCO occupation. The regression is weighted by the industry-specific employment numbers in the
base year (1992). The figure plots the estimates of α1t and α2t for each year (t).
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Figure 5: Wage growth by industry and quantile, 1992-2009
The results show the fitted values from regression equation ∆w
q
jt = γj0 + γj1w
q
j0 + ηj where q = 1, ..., 10 stands
for quantile, γj0 is a vector of industry dummies, and γj1w
q
j0 is the interaction between base-year wage and industry
dummy. The fitted values are plotted against base-year wage for all ten quantiles of each two-digit ISIC industry.
132
SENEVIRATNE: Chapter 3
Figure 6: Wage growth by occupation and quantile, 1992-2009
The results show the fitted values from regression equation ∆w
q
jt = γj0 + γj1w
q
j0 + ηj where q = 1, ..., 10 stands
for quantile, γj0 is a vector of occupation dummies, and γj1w
q
j0 is the interaction between base-year wage and occupation
dummy. The fitted values are plotted against base-year wage for all ten quantiles of each two-digit ISCO occupation.
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Figure 7: Offshorability regression, 1992 and 2009
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Figure 8: Offshorability regression, 1992-2009
Each plot represents a particular year. The plots get progressively darker from 1992 to 2009.
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Figure 9: Total wage change
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Table 1: Offshorability indices
Task measure O*NET Work activities O*NET Work context
Information and internet Getting information
Processing information
Analyzing data or information
Interacting with computers
Documenting/recording information
Physical presence Inspecting equipment, structures, or material
Performing general physical activities
Handling and moving objects
Controlling machines and processes
Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment
Repairing and maintaining mechanical equipment
Repairing and maintaining electronic equipment
Interpersonal Establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships Face to face discussions
Assisting and caring for others Coordinate or lead others
Resolving conflict and negotiating with others
Performing for or working directly with the public
Coordinating the work and activities of others
Guiding, directing, and motivating subordinates
Coaching and developing others
Decision-making and creativity Making decisions and solving problems Responsibility for outcomes and results
Thinking creatively Impact of decisions on co-workers or company results
Developing objectives and strategies Frequency of decision-making
Freedom to make decisions
Routine physical Spend time making repetitive motions
Degree of automation
Importance of repeating same tasks
Structured versus unstructured work (reverse)





Table 2: Physical and cognitive skills
Task Measure O*NET Abilities O*NET Skills







Cognitive skills Oral comprehension Mathematics
Written comprehension Critical thinking
Deductive reasoning Social perceptiveness




















Table 3: Mean task content by major occupation group
Occupation group Median Information Routine Physical Interpersonal Decision Physical Cognitive
Wage Presence Skills Skills
All 0.5596 0.2851 0.5713 0.7006 0.6841 0.4798 0.5157
Professionals 4.120 0.6579 0.2006 0.3686 0.7703 0.7437 0.2799 0.5593
Legislators, Senior Officials, Managers 3.953 0.6760 0.1886 0.4084 0.7899 0.8211 0.3497 0.5837
Clerks 3.752 0.7262 0.2812 0.3396 0.7955 0.7524 0.2097 0.6221
Technicians, Associate Professionals 3.734 0.7211 0.2157 0.4143 0.7159 0.7133 0.3542 0.5702
Plant Machine Operators, Assemblers 3.362 0.6645 0.3163 0.5735 0.7637 0.7319 0.4272 0.4875
Crafts and Related Trades 3.244 0.5052 0.2698 0.6010 0.6525 0.6752 0.5076 0.4891
Service, Shop and Market Sales 3.094 0.5633 0.2177 0.4407 0.7396 0.6886 0.4075 0.4571
Elementary 2.907 0.4940 0.3049 0.5345 0.6258 0.5591 0.4931 0.4823





Table 4: Aggregated decomposition: offshorability specification
Statistic 1992 2009 Change Covariate effect Wage struc. effect
10th quant. 2.192 2.620 0.429 0.075 0.353
(0.102) (0.042) (0.260 ; 0.628) (-0.064; 0.199) (0.176; 0.588)
25th quant. 2.770 3.050 0.280 0.022 0.258
(0.077) (0.029) (0.142; 0.417) (-0.084; 0.104) (0.107; 0.407)
50th quant. 3.292 3.546 0.254 0.029 0.225
(0.038) (0.032) (0.167; 0.336) (-0.052; 0.099) (0.133; 0.315)
75th quant. 3.670 4.029 0.359 0.074 0.285
(0.024) (0.028) (0.301; 0.425) (-0.006; 0.147 ) (0.205; 0.362)
90th quant. 4.007 4.430 0.423 0.059 0.364
(0.0395) (0.037) (0.330; 0.524 (-0.059; 0.147) (0.274; 0.500)
99th quant. 4.664 5.086 0.422 0.067 0.356
(0.078) (0.031) (0.230; 0.626) (-0.157; 0.174) (0.209; 0.644)
Mean 3.181 3.512 0.331 0.028 0.303
(0.031) (0.024) (0.268; 0.387 (-0.024; 0.096) (0.226; 0.373)
Variance 0.549 0.590 0.042 0.057 -0.015
(0.034) (0.035) (-0.037; 0.129) (-0.029; 0.125) (-0.101; 0.073)
Table 5: Aggregate decomposition: cognitive ratio specification
Statistic 1992 2009 Change Covariate effect Wage struc. effect
10th quant. 2.204 2.575 0.371 0.094 0.277
(0.113) (0.044) (0.202; 0.587) (-0.024; 0.211) (0.084; 0.516)
25th quant. 2.734 3.039 0.304 0.165 0.139
(0.057) (0.030) (0.194; 0.399) (0.085; 0.246) (0.011; 0.246)
50th quant. 3.240 3.528 0.288 0.156 0.131
(0.031) (0.036) (0.195; 0.359) (0.081; 0.241) (0.043; 0.213)
75th quant. 3.691 3.975 0.284 0.163 0.121
(0.036) (0.017) (0.207; 0.351) (0.083; 0.223) (0.039; 0.201)
90th quant. 4.049 4.405 0.356 0.141 0.215
(0.039) (0.032) (0.265; 0.445) (0.021; 0.228) (0.099; 0.320)
99th quant. 4.748 5.092 0.344 0.003 0.341
(0.091) (0.078) (-0.069; 0.530) (-0.314; 0.338) (-0.068; 0.620)
Mean 3.176 3.496 0.320 0.152 0.168
(0.033) (0.024) (0.262; 0.381) (0.085; 0.208) (0.090; 0.245)
Variance 0.574 0.544 -0.030 -0.032 0.002


















Table 6: Individual composition effects
Pot. exp. Sex Education Offshorability Technology Personable Cog-phys ratio
10th quant. -0.0360 0.062 0.169 0.267 0.095 0.172 0.006
(0.055) (0.051) (0.053) (0.242) (0.102) (0.152) (0.056)
(-0.147; 0.061) (-0.058; 0.142) (0.069; 0.287) (-0.254; 0.688) (-0.109; 0.278) (-0.157; 0.436) (-0.102; 0.121)
25th quant. 0.012 -0.065 0.125 0.025 0.096 -0.071 0.077
(0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.157) (0.080) (0.097) (0.045)
(-0.060; 0.097) (-0.157; 0.012) (0.052; 0.202) (-0.278; 0.322) (-0.068; 0.249) (-0.269; 0.110) (0.000; 0.168)
50th quant. -0.026 -0.018 0.152 0.128 0.059 0.069 0.030
(0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.171) (0.081) (0.102) (0.038)
(-0.119 ;0.054) (-0.102; 0.063) (0.086; 0.226) (-0.234; 0.419) (-0.111; 0.209) (-0.147; 0.246) (-0.047; 0.103)
75th quant. -0.025 -0.079 0.205 0.284 0.139 0.145 -0.002
(0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.143) (0.073) (0.090) (0.031)
(-0.106; 0.060) (-0.161; 0.014) (0.125; 0.285) (0.040; 0.600) (0.010; 0.298) (-0.017; 0.350) (-0.064; 0.078)
90th quant. -0.063 -0.086 0.184 0.397 0.213 0.184 -0.085
(0.058) (0.070) (0.053) (0.199) (0.094) (0.117) (0.065)
(-0.163; 0.057) (-0.203; 0.047) (0.079; 0.261) (0.007; 0.757) (0.003; 0.378) (-0.080; 0.381) (-0.203; 0.037)
99th quant. -0.258 -0.080 0.299 0.010 0.031 -0.021 -0.456
(0.130) (0.088) (0.083) (0.337) (0.270) (0.185) (0.099)
(-0.481; -0.023) (-0.256; 0.108) (-0.072; 0.385) (-0.899; 0.515) (-0.781; 0.355) (-0.363; 0.306) (-0.649; -0.344)
Mean -0.021 -0.044 0.158 0.149 0.079 0.069 0.011
(0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.135) (0.063) (0.084) (0.031)
(-0.095; 0.043) (-0.115; 0.029) (0.101; 0.217) (-0.122; 0.408) (-0.045; 0.197) (-0.095; 0.230) (-0.050; 0.072)
Variance 0.020 0.007 0.104 0.241 0.095 0.146 -0.100
(0.047) (0.048) (0.042) (0.181) (0.082) 0.115 (0.050)




















Table 7: Individual coefficient effects
Pot. exp. Sex Education Offshorability Technology Personable Cog-phys ratio
10th quant. 0.465 0.367 0.259 1.876 0.761 1.114 0.365
(0.110) (0.104) (0.109) (0.503) (0.210) (0.315) (0.111)
(0.309; 0.697) (0.217; 0.597) (0.110; 0.499) (1.226; 3.005) (0.473; 1.219) (0.685; 1.800) (0.191; 0.592)
25th quant. 0.268 0.345 0.155 1.375 0.464 0.911 0.227
(0.081) (0.079) (0.077) (0.373) (0.156) (0.224) (0.064)
(0.121; 0.415) (0.210; 0.490) (0.009; 0.298) (0.826; 2.123) (0.183; 0.734) (0.533; 1.336) (0.105; 0.341)
50th quant. 0.280 0.272 0.102 1.141 0.448 0.693 0.258
(0.050) (0.048) (0.044) (0.198) (0.087) (0.116) (0.038)
(0.184; 0.379) (0.183; 0.364) (0.015; 0.188) (0.795; 1.551) (0.291; 0.625) (0.486; 0.933) (0.175; 0.329)
75th quant. 0.384 0.438 0.154 1.509 0.579 0.931 0.286
(0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.147) (0.071) (0.089) (0.040)
(0.310; 0.470) 0.351; 0.520) (0.078; 0.245) (1.222; 1.842) (0.432; 0.715) (0.740; 1.096) (0.196; 0.357)
90th quant. 0.486 0.509 0.239 1.717 0.632 1.085 0.441
(0.058) (0.069) (0.053) (0.211) (0.099) (0.122) (0.072)
(0.374; 0.598) (0.384; 0.650) (0.144; 0.354) (1.352; 2.189) (0.464; 0.858) (0.859; 1.380) (0.310; 0.580)
99th quant. 0.680 0.503 0.124 2.101 0.813 1.288 0.800
(0.155) (0.122) (0.119) (0.512) (0.306) (0.331) (0.110)
(0.390; 1.022) (0.279; 0.789) (-0.037; 0.450) (1.251; 3.253) (0.129; 1.356) (0.795; 2.118) (0.250; 0.910)
Mean 0.352 0.375 0.173 1.508 0.583 0.925 0.309
(0.040) (0.039) (0.035) (0.158) (0.070) (0.101) (0.037)
(0.274; 0.433) (0.300; 0.452) (0.105; 0.241) (1.181; 1.816) (0.448; 0.717) (0.712; 1.108) (0.238; 0.383)
Variance 0.022 0.035 -0.062 -0.031 -0.011 -0.020 0.070
(0.049) (0.046) (0.043) (0.198) (0.080) (0.122) (0.058)




















Table 8: Most offshorable occupations with wage distribution rank
Information Routine
Occupation Rank Occupation Rank
Mathematicians, statisticians 44 Glass, ceramics plant operators 95
Physicists, chemists and related professionals 10 Wood-processing-, papermaking-plant operators 82
Life science professionals 1 Metal-processing-plant operators 21
Business professionals 9 Chemical-processing-plant operators 74
Life science technicians 39 Manufacturing laborers 79
Higher education teaching professionals 5 Agricultural and other mobile-plant operators 37
Nursing and midwifery professionals 33 Cashiers, tellers 58
Computing professionals 6 Optical, electronic equipment operators 54
Finance and sales associate professionals 25 Mining- and mineral-processing-plant operators 101
Legal professionals 2 Mining and construction laborers 85
Computer associate professionals 27 Metal-, mineral-products machine operators 59
Architects, engineers 7 Blacksmiths, tool-makers 65
Archivists, librarians 20 Printing workers 63
Police inspectors and detectives 67 Assemblers 41




















Table 8 (contd): Most offshorable occupations with wage distribution rank
Physical presence Interpersonal Decision/creativity
Occupation Rank Occupation Rank
Mathematicians, statisticians 44 Fashion and other models 68 Fashion and other models 68
Legal professionals 2 Handicraft workers in wood, textile, leather 80 Subsistence agricultural and fishery workers 94
Higher education teaching professionals 5 Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades workers 83 Agricultural, fishery laborers 96
Stall and market salespersons 49 Potters, glass-makers 71 Building caretakers, window cleaners 35
Fashion and other models 68 Wood treaters, cabinet-makers 90 Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades workers 83
Business professionals 9 Metal-processing-plant operators 21 Agricultural and other mobile-plant operators 37
Directors and chief executives 3 Blacksmiths, tool-makers 65 Domestic helpers, cleaners and launderers 99
Senior government officials 4 Building caretakers, window cleaners 35 Street vendors and related workers 92
Traditional chiefs and heads of villages 40 Subsistence agricultural and fishery workers 94 Manufacturing laborers 79
Street vendors and related workers 92 Domestic helpers, cleaners and launderers 99 Stall and market salespersons 49
Other teaching associate professionals 26 Textile, garment workers 73 Ships’ deck crews 8
Business services agents and trade brokers 43 Stall and market salespersons 49 Blacksmiths, tool-makers 65
Computing professionals 6 Agricultural, fishery laborers 96 Food processing workers 97
Other teaching professionals 13 Street vendors and related workers 92 Metal-processing-plant operators 21






Figures C.1 and C.2 below show the fitted values of ∆wdjt from Equation 3 with quantile dum-
mies included to capture any quantile-specific trends. Again, the occupation plots show a dis-
tinct U shape. Low-wage (high-wage) occupations have convex (concave) plots, emphasizing
the strong relative wage growth experienced by the lowest-paid (highest-paid) workers. The
quantile dummies thus further emphasize the extent of wage polarization.
Figure C.1: Wage growth with quantile effects: industries:
The results show the fitted values from regression equation ∆w
q
jt = γj0 + γq2 + γj1w
q
j0 + ηj where q = 1, ..., 10
stands for quantile, γj0 is a vector of industry dummies, γj1w
q
j0 is the interaction between base-year wage and industry
dummy, and γq2 is a vector of quantile dummies. The fitted values are plotted against base-year wage for all ten quantiles
of each two-digit ISIC industry.
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Figure C.2: Wage growth with quantile effects: occupations:
The results show the fitted values from regression equation ∆w
q
jt = γj0 + γq2 + γj1w
q
j0 + ηj where q = 1, ..., 10
stands for quantile, γj0 is a vector of occupation dummies, γj1w
q
j0 is the interaction between base-year wage and occu-
pation dummy, and γq2 is a vector of quantile dummies. The fitted values are plotted against base-year wage for all ten
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